数字经济健康发展:平台企业并购的规制困局及破解  

Healthy Development of the Digital Economy:the Regulatory Dilemma and Solution of Platform Enterpris

作　　者：李胜利[1] 解明辉 Li Shengli;Xie Minghui

机构地区：[1]安徽大学法学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2023年第5期25-33,共9页Competition Policy Research

基　　金：2021年度安徽高校人文社会科学研究项目(安徽大学经济法制研究中心)重大项目“数字经济时代竞争法的新发展”(项目编号:SK2021ZD0001)的研究成果。

摘　　要：平台企业大规模的并购改变了原本的市场结构,削弱了“无形之手”对市场的调控能力。因其并购主体、并购动机的独有特点,作为预防经营者过度集中的经营者集中审查制度面临困境,包括申报“逃逸”、并购影响分析困难、救济措施选择争议。针对申报“逃逸”,可以引入新的申报标准,并建立平台企业“特别名单”;针对并购影响分析困难,建议采用盈利模式测试法对相关市场界定做精简化处理,认定市场力量时加强对数据的考量,面对不能确定市场影响的并购引入行业规制和自我规制来强化反垄断力量;针对救济措施的选择,应当坚持当前以行为救济为主的路径。The large-scale mergers and acquisitions of platform companies have changed the original market structure and weakened the ability of the“invisible hand”to regulate the market.Due to the unique characteristics of merger subjects and merger motives,the concentration review system to prevent excessive concentration of business operators is facing difficulties,including reporting“escape”,difficulties in analyzing the impact of mergers and acquisitions,and disputes over the selection of relief measures.For the declaration of“escape”,new declaration standards can be introduced,and a“special list”of platform companies can be established;in view of the difficulty in analyzing the impact of mergers and acquisitions,it is recommended to use the profit model test method to simplify the definition of the relevant market,and strengthen the analysis of data when identifying market forces.In the face of mergers and acquisitions whose market impact cannot be determined,industry regulation and self-regulation should be introduced to strengthen anti-monopoly power;for the choice of relief measures,the current path of behavioral relief should be adhered to.

关 键 词：平台经济 经营者集中 相关市场界定 市场影响 行为救济 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F271