竞争法视角下SEP善意许可谈判框架之构建  

The Construction of SEP Good Faith License Negotiation Framework from the Perspective of Competition Law

作　　者：任天一 Ren Tianyi

机构地区：[1]中国计量大学法学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2023年第5期34-44,共11页Competition Policy Research

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“新一轮知识产权国际争端解决机制的变革与重构及我国的因应对策研究”(项目编号:21BFX101)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：欧盟法院通过“华为诉中兴案”构建了一个颇具影响力的FRAND许可费善意谈判框架,但仍存在一些问题有待进一步澄清,如SEP持有人提起侵权诉讼的条件,SEP持有人发出的要约是否须在实体上符合FRAND原则,法院审查要约合理性的义务及审查方法等。对华为—中兴善意谈判机制进行合理解读,需认识到欧盟竞争法干预SEP许可行为具有双重目标——提高SEP许可效率,维护下游市场的竞争效率。SEP持有人在未履行发出侵权通知与要约的程序性义务之前,不得申请禁令救济,同时,SEP持有人应承担对其要约符合FRAND原则的举证责任。法院对这一问题的审查主要考虑两个方面:一是SEP持有人差别对待被许可方是否有合理理由,二是差异性的对待是否会影响下游市场的竞争。The CJEU has constructed an influential framework for good faith negotiation of FRAND license fees through the Huawei v.ZTE,but there are still some issues to be further clarified——conditions for SEP holders to bring infringement lawsuits,whether the offer made by SEP holders must comply with the FRAND principle in substance,the obligation of the court to review the reasonableness of the offer and the method of review,etc.A reasonable interpretation of the Huawei-ZTE Benign Negotiation Mechanism requires recognition that EU competition law intervenes in SEP licensing practices with a dual objective-to promote the efficiency of SEP licensing and to maintain the efficiency of competition in downstream markets.An SEP holder should not raise an infringement injunction before it has fulfilled its procedural obligation to issue an infringement notice and offer,and,at the same time SEP holder should bear the burden of proving that its offer complies with the FRAND principle.The court's examination of this issue considers two main aspects:first,whether the SEP holder's differential treatment of the licensee is reasonably justified,and second,whether the differential treatment will affect competition in the downstream market.

关 键 词：标准必要专利 SEP善意谈判框架 侵权诉讼禁令 华为诉中兴案 

分 类 号：D996[政治法律—经济法学]