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作 者:崔金栋[1] 朱增陈 李若彤 CUI Jindong;ZHU Zengchen;LI Ruotong(School of Economics and Management,Northeast Electric Power University,Jilin 132012,China)
机构地区:[1]东北电力大学经济管理学院,吉林吉林132012
出 处:《综合智慧能源》2023年第11期55-61,共7页Integrated Intelligent Energy
基 金:吉林省社会科学基金项目(2022J10)。
摘 要:随着新型电力系统建设的推进,用户侧小型储能装置愈发受到重视。然而无序的充放电管理模式既给电网带来安全运行隐患,又造成资源浪费。基于此,提出一种通过储能聚合商云服务平台实现用户侧小储能装置联合调度的运行模式。建立综合考虑储能运营商、储能装置投资者和电网等各参与主体的最优运行模型,然后基于纳什均衡理论建立各参与主体在约束条件下的合作博弈模型。通过算例仿真分析,对模型求解得出最优共享储能定价方案。结果表明:多主体合作最优定价方案达到了削峰填谷、节约资源的目的,同时实现了电网、储能聚合商、储能装置投资者的多方共赢。提出的定价机制被验证具有一定的可行性和科学性。With the advancement of the construction of new power systems,small energy storage devices on the user side have become increasingly important.However,their disorder charging and discharging behaviors not only pose safety hazards to the power grid,but also cause resource waste.Based on this,a joint scheduling mode for small energy storage devices on the user side is proposes,which are integrated on an energy storage aggregator cloud service platform.The optimal operation models for energy storage operators,energy storage device investors,and the power grid are established.Based on Nash equilibrium theory,a cooperative game model for all participating entities under their constraints is established.In a numerical simulation analysis,the optimal pricing scheme for shared energy storage devices is obtained by model solving.The results indicate that the optimal pricing scheme can not only achieve the goals of peak load regulation and resources saving,but also lead to a win-win situation among the three participating entities.The feasibility and scientificity of the proposed pricing mechanism have been proven.
关 键 词:新型电力系统 用户侧小储能 共享储能 储能聚合商 联合调度 “双碳”目标 削峰填谷 纳什均衡 需求侧管理
分 类 号:TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化] F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]
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