基于博弈分析的电梯责任保险推广研究  

Research on Promotion of Elevator Liability Insurance Based on Perfect Information Static Game Analysis

作　　者：杨黎 吴昊钟 邓文 邹皓 张甜甜 Yang Li;Wu Haozhong;Deng Wen;Zou Hao;Zhang Tiantian(Sichuan Special Equipment Inspection and Research Institute,Chengdu 610061)

机构地区：[1]四川省特种设备检验研究院,成都610061

出　　处：《中国特种设备安全》2023年第11期24-28,共5页China Special Equipment Safety

基　　金：四川省市场监督管理局科技计划项目“协同治理视角下电梯责任保险制度研究”(SCSJZ2022008)。

摘　　要：电梯责任保险可以发挥电梯事故赔偿和电梯安全风险预防的作用,本文探究了博弈论在电梯责任保险推广中的作用。在确定博弈主体的基础上,建立了以保险公司为承保方,电梯使用单位为投保方的博弈模型,并进行了博弈均衡分析,发现政府补贴是电梯责任保险顺利推广的必要条件。最终,针对电梯责任保险推广过程中的不同阶段提出了建议。Elevator liability insurance can play the role of elevator accident compensation and elevator safety risk prevention.This paper explores the role of game theory in the promotion of elevator liability insurance.On the basis of determining the main players of the game,a game model with the insurance company as the underwriter and the elevator user as the insurant is established,and the game equilibrium analysis is carried out.It is found that the government subsidy is the necessary condition for the smooth promotion of elevator liability insurance.Finally,suggestions are put forward for different stages in the promotion process of elevator liability insurance.

关 键 词：电梯责任保险 电梯安全 博弈均衡分析 

分 类 号：X941[环境科学与工程—安全科学]