非控股大股东退出威胁对“自利性”捐赠的治理作用--基于控股股东股权质押视角  

The governance effect of Non-controlling Large Shareholders’Exit Threat on Self-interested Donations?Based on the situation of equity pledge of controlling shareholders

作　　者：李蒙 李秉祥[2] 张涛 Li Meng;Li Bingxiang;Zhang Tao(School of Management,Xi’an Polytechnic University;School of Economics and Management,Xi’an University of Technology;School of Business,Gansu University of Political Science and Law)

机构地区：[1]西安工程大学管理学院 [2]西安理工大学经济与管理学院 [3]甘肃政法大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2023年第4期77-88,I0016,I0017,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71772151);陕西省社会科学基金项目(2023R036);陕西省教育厅人文社科专项项目(23JK0124)资助。

摘　　要：非控股大股东退出威胁是其发挥公司治理的一种主要形式。本文以2003-2019年度中国A股上市公司为样本,重点考察了控股股东股权质押背景下非控股大股东退出威胁对自利性捐赠行为的影响与作用机理。研究结论表明:(1)控股股东股权质押下公司慈善性捐赠具有明显自利动机;(2)具有可置信退出威胁的非控股大股东,能够对控股股东股权质押下自利捐赠行为产生明显的抑制作用;(3)控股股东降低控制权转移风险与避免自身财富损失的双重内在需求,是非控股大股东退出威胁发挥治理效应的关键。具体而言,当控股股东股权质押比例较高时,非控股大股东退出威胁通过影响控股股东控制权转移风险而产生治理效应;而当股权质押比例较低时,则通过影响控股股东财富损失来传导约束作用。研究结论有助于阐明非控股大股东退出威胁对控股股东股权质押下自利性捐赠的治理路径,为完善上市公司大股东治理机制提供理论依据。As the capital market progressively matures and regulatory policies are sequentially introduced,the right of non-controlling shareholders is effectively safeguarded.The role and approach for non-controlling major shareholders to exercise their governance function have become a prominent topic in both theoretical and practical circles.Among them,the exit threat by non-controlling ma-jor shareholders is one of the main paths.Corporate philanthropy as an embodiment of fulfilling social responsibility,contributing to enhancing enterprise image and reputation while fostering positive interaction between enterprises and society.Nevertheless,within China’s listed companies,a phenomenon persists where controlling shareholders,despite grappling with substantial financial pres-sures,continue to exhibit enthusiasm for the company’s charitable donation activities.This warrants further investigation.The pur-pose of this paper is to delve into the donation motivations of controlling shareholders underlying this paradoxical behavior,as well as to examine whether non-controlling major shareholders can exert influence on the philanthropic actions of controlling shareholders through the implementation of exit threat strategies.In this research,the empirical test is conducted using a sample from China’s A-share listed companies spanning from 2003 to 2019.First of all,it examines the motivations driving controlling shareholders’charitable donation behavior under equity pledges.Secondly,it examines the potential significant impact of exit threats exerted by non-controlling major shareholders on donations primarily moti-vated by self-interest among controlling shareholders.Finally,the mechanism analysis is employed to elucidate the pathways through which non-controlling major shareholders exert their governance influence through the utilization of exit threats.The results show that:(1)Charitable donations have obvious self-interested motivation under the pledge of controlling shareholders’equity.(2)The non-controlling major

关 键 词：非控股大股东 退出威胁 自利性捐赠 股权质押 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] C913.7[社会学]