不完全考核:模糊与精细混合的政府考核分析  

Incomplete Performance Evaluation:An Analysis of Coexistence of Ambiguity and Accuracy in Government Performance Evaluation

作　　者：练宏[1] 陈纯 Lian Hong;Chen Chun

机构地区：[1]中山大学中国公共管理研究中心 [2]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院

出　　处：《社会学研究》2023年第6期84-106,M0005,共24页Sociological Studies

摘　　要：本文通过田野观察一个税务部门连续三年的考核过程,揭示了考核的复杂运作图景,即受制于政府科层组织的独特制度环境,考核难以完全按照泰勒科学管理的思路来进行精细化考核,而是呈现出模糊与精细并存的混合考核实践。其中,精细化考核只是初步实现了考核目的,之后组织通过模糊运作获得权威控制,缓解了精细化考核的事本主义,具有“模糊的精确性”功能。本研究有助于重新解释考核中的偏差行为、审视单向度的科学管理和呼应国家当前对唯指标论和优绩主义的反思。Through three consecutive years of fieldwork on the performance evaluation process of a tax bureau,this paper reveals a complex operational picture of performance evaluation,that is,due to the unique institutional environment,performance evaluation is difficult to be conducted simply in accordance with the Taylor scientific management of accurate evaluation,but rather presents a hybrid practice in which both accuracy and ambiguity coexist. Among them,accurate evaluation only initially achieves the evaluation goals,after which organizations gain authoritative control through ambiguous operations,alleviating the deviation of performance evaluation,and functioning as “ambiguous precision”. This study contributes to reinterpreting biased behaviors in performance evaluation,reflecting on unidirectional scientific management,and echoing the current rethinking of indexism and meritocracy.

关 键 词：不完全考核 量化管理 混合考核 政府行为 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]