归纳风险与非认知价值在科学中的正当作用  

Inductive Risk and the Role of Non-epistemic Values in Science

作　　者：王亚峰 WANG Ya-feng(Institute of Philosophy,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院哲学研究所,北京100190

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2023年第10期84-91,共8页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：归纳风险论证是近年来科学哲学界对科学的价值无涉理想的最强有力的批判之一。其核心论点是:归纳风险存在于科学的各个环节中,因此科学家在科学活动中应当作出非认知的价值判断。通过系统地梳理现有文献中的归纳风险的概念和类别,区分了四个有影响力的归纳风险的子概念:(1)假设评估中的归纳风险;(2)假设评估前的归纳风险;(3)科学交流与传播中的归纳风险;(4)社会化的归纳风险。同时,分析了不同的归纳风险的子概念对归纳风险论证的辩护产生的影响,以及对归纳风险的应对和管理所起到的帮助。The argument from inductive risk(AIR)is one of the strongest challenges to"the value-free ideal for science",the thesis that non-epistemic values should not influence"internal"parts of science.According to AIR,inductive risk is present in numerous decisions in scientific reasoning;there-fore,non-epistemic value judgments should play a role in shaping these decisions.By surveying the literature,four influential conceptions of inductive risk are distinguished:(1)inductive risk in hypothesis evaluation;(2)inductive risk prior to hypothesis evaluation;(3)inductive risk in science commu-nication;(4)socialized inductive risk.In addition,it is shown that different conceptions of inductive risk make a dfference to the strength and limitations ofAIR.

关 键 词：非认知价值 归纳风险 价值无涉理想 科学与社会 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]