控股股东股权质押与数字化转型信息策略性披露——基于信息沟通与信息操纵视角  被引量:5

Controlling Shareholders'Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information:From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation

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作  者:朱杰 苏亚民[1] ZHU Jie;SU Ya-min(School of Management,South-Central Minzu University,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区:[1]中南民族大学管理学院,湖北武汉430073

出  处:《广东财经大学学报》2023年第5期75-95,共21页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基  金:湖北省社会科学基金项目(2021022)。

摘  要:上市公司披露数字化转型信息时是否存在策略性行为,是实务界高度关注但学术界相对忽视的重要问题。利用2007—2020年中国A股上市公司数据,以控股股东股权质押为场景,探讨上市公司数字化转型信息披露动机、策略性披露行为及其引发的经济后果。研究发现:存在控股股东股权质押行为的上市公司为了稳定股价,在年报中通常会增加数字化转型信息的披露。因此,信息沟通与信息操纵均构成股权质押公司增加数字化转型信息披露的动机。但是,股权质押公司更有可能出于信息操纵动机策略性地披露数字化转型信息,表现为控股股东股权质押程度越高、控制权转移风险越高的上市公司,信息操纵动机下的年报数字化转型信息夸大披露程度也越高。经济后果检验发现,股权质押公司夸大披露数字化转型信息虽然能在一定程度上稳定股价,缓解股价崩盘风险,但也会降低公司未来的市场绩效与经营绩效,引发更大的经济损失。异质性检验发现,机构投资者治理、债权人治理与内部股东治理,是抑制股权质押公司数字化转型信息夸大披露的有效措施。研究结论有助于会计信息使用者合理甄别数字化转型信息披露中潜在的风险问题。Whether there is strategic behavior in the information disclosure of digital transformation by listed companies is an important issue that is highly concerned by the practical community but relatively overlooked by the academic community.Using data from A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020,this study explores the motivation for information disclosure of digital transformation,and strategic disclosure behavior of listed companies caused by the controlling shareholders'equity pledge.It is found that listed companies with controlling shareholders'equity pledges will increase information disclosure of digital transformation in their annual reports in order to achieve the goal of stock price stability.Therefore,information communication and manipulation both constitute the motivation for companies with equity pledge to increase information disclosure of digital transformation.However,companies with equity pledge are more likely to strategically disclose digital transformation information due to motives for information manipulation.The manifestation is that the higher the degree of equity pledge by controlling shareholders and the higher the risk of control transfer,the higher the degree of exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information in annual reports of listed companies under the motivation for information manipulation.It is found through economic consequence tests that the exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information by companies with equity pledge can to some extent achieve the goal of stock price stability and alleviate the risk of stock price collapse.However,this exaggerated disclosure behavior will reduce the company's future market and operational performance,leading to greater economic losses.Heterogeneity tests indicate that the governance of institutional investor,creditor,and internal shareholder is effective measures to suppress the exaggerated information disclosure of digital transformation in companies with equity pledge.The research conclusions enrich the

关 键 词:控股股东 股权质押 数字化转型 信息披露 策略性披露 信息沟通 信息操纵 

分 类 号:F234.4[经济管理—会计学] F830.91[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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