行政审批改革、垄断势力与统一大市场建设  

Administrative Approval Reform, Monopoly Power and the Construction of an Integrated Big Market

作　　者：万攀兵 陈林 张中祥[1] Panbing WAN;Lin CHEN;Zhongxiang ZHANG(Ma Yinchu School of Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Institute of Industrial Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学马寅初经济学院,天津300072 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [3]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广州510632

出　　处：《计量经济学报》2023年第4期1092-1121,共30页China Journal of Econometrics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AZD050);国家社会科学基金重大项目(20&ZD109);教育部人文社科基金青年项目(22YJC790118);中国博士后科学基金(2022M722374)。

摘　　要：当前,加快建设高效规范、公平竞争、充分开放的全国统一大市场被党中央和国务院提升到全局和战略高度.本文从公平竞争的视角切入,基于我国地级市先后设立行政审批中心的公共政策实验,考察了以“放管服”为主要方向的行政审批改革对于打破垄断进而推动统一大市场建设的政策效果.研究发现:我国以行政审批中心为载体的行政审批改革有助于降低企业垄断势力并促进公平竞争.然而,由于“放管服”力度有限、未能有效降低企业实际面临的制度性交易成本,行政审批中心的设立仅在短期内降低了企业垄断势力,而长期来看并不具有持续推动企业进入和公平竞争的效果.进一步分析发现,设立行政审批中心仅对东部地区和非国有企业具有抑制垄断势力的短期效果.并且,相比于早期设立的行政审批中心而言,后期设立的行政审批中心对垄断势力的抑制效果更明显.文章的发现可为当前我国加快建设统一大市场提供直接的政策启示.Currently,the Party Central Committee and the State Council have elevated the building of an integrated national market with high efficiency,fair competition,and full openness to a global and strategic level.Based on the public policy experiment of setting up administrative approval centers in prefecture-level cities in China,this paper examines the effect of administrative approval reform with the main direction of"reform of government functions"on breaking monopolies and promoting the construction of an integrated market from the perspective of fair competition.The study finds that the administrative approval reform through administrative approval centers in China helps reduce the monopoly power of enterprises and promote fair competition.However,due to the limited efforts of"reform of government functions"and failure to effectively reduce the institutional transaction costs faced by enterprises,the establishment of administrative approval centers only reduces the monopoly power of enterprises in the short term,but does not have a sustained effect on promoting enterprise entry and fair competition in the long term.Further analysis shows that the establishment of administrative approval centers only has the short-term effect of suppressing monopoly power for eastern regions and non-state enterprises.Moreover,the suppression of monopoly power is more pronounced for the administrative approval centers set up later than for those established earlier.These findings can provide direct policy implications for the current construction of an integrated big market in China.

关 键 词：行政审批改革 垄断势力 制度性交易成本 企业进入 统一大市场 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F123.9[政治法律—中外政治制度]