地方政府、稀土企业与新能源企业协同创新演化博弈研究  被引量:3

Evolutionary Game Research on Collaborative Innovation among Local Government, Rare Earth Enterprises and New Energy Enterprises

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作  者:贾扬蕾[1] 许礼刚[1] 周怡婷 JIA Yanglei;XU Ligang;ZHOU Yiting(School of Economics and Management,Jiangxi University of Science and Technology,Ganzhou 341000,China)

机构地区:[1]江西理工大学经济管理学院,江西赣州341000

出  处:《运筹与管理》2023年第10期37-42,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基  金:国家重点研发计划项目(2020YFB1713700);江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ200817);江西理工大学繁荣哲学社会科学项目(FZ19-YB-07)。

摘  要:协同创新是加快新兴技术深度交叉融合、产业链向高端化延伸的重要途径。本文从系统角度出发,构建地方政府、稀土企业、新能源企业三方演化博弈模型,研究三方博弈策略选择的影响因素及其互动机制,并引入中国“稀土王国”赣州的企业案例,对博弈模型进行数值模拟分析。研究结果表明:稀土企业与新能源企业参与协同创新的意愿不受彼此初始意愿影响,而随地方政府积极推行政策意愿的提升而加快;地方政府激励和监管的强度与稀土企业、新能源企业参与协同创新的意愿正相关;地方政府懒政、不作为的代价越大,越倾向选择“积极推行”策略。其研究结论为地方政府制定协同创新及产业化管理机制提供了相关对策建议。Due to the important correlation between rare earths and new energy technology products such as wind turbines,new energy drive motors,and nickel hydrogen batteries,in recent years,local governments in China have built collaborative innovation platforms,developed a series of incentive industrial development policies such as financial subsidies and tax incentives,to promote rare earth industry and new energy industry to strengthen resources sharing and strive to break through the bottlenecks of industrial technology.However,there are some drawbacks in the mechanism of collaborative innovation of rare earth industry,new energy industry that is led by local government,such as the weakened effect of local government leading function,the low motivation and efficiency of industries which participate in it.According to these shortages,the tripartite evolutionary game model about collaboration innovation,guided by local government,and led by rare earth enterprises and new energy enterprises,is constructed.In order to figure out the game evolution strategies of local government,rare earth enterprise and new energy enterprise in different situations,the strategy choices among the three parties during the collaborative innovation process are analyzed.Providing the collaboration innovation center constructed by three parties as a case,where the Jiangxi Provincial Government and Ganzhou Municipal Government are the government side,Jiangxi Jinli Permanent Magnet Technology Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as“Jinli Permanent Magnet”)is the rare earth enterprise side,and Xinjiang Jinfeng Technology Co.,Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as“Jinfeng Technology”)is the new energy enterprise side,the factors that influence the strategy choices of their collaboration are studied by simulation.In this article,the local government data is obtained through relevant policies and documents,and the research and development costs and tax refund data of Jinli Permanent Magnet and Jinfeng Technology are obtained from the annual reports of li

关 键 词:地方政府 稀土企业 新能源企业 协同创新 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F204[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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