行政偏差的政治矫正:对信访体制的功能分析  

Political Correction of Grassroots Administrative Deviation:Functional Analysis of the Petition System

作　　者：于龙刚[1] Yu Longgang

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学法学院

出　　处：《荆楚法学》2023年第5期121-133,共13页Jingchu Law Review

摘　　要：我国的信访体制具有纠正行政偏差的功能。行政偏差具体表现为政策不完备和执行变通,而这都可能导致特定政策受体利益受损,进而诱发矛盾。由于受理范围的限制,此类矛盾很难通过行政复议、行政诉讼的方式得以化解,转而进入信访系统。信访制度及其依托的党政体制采用高位推动的方式来化解矛盾,形成一套政治化的矛盾化解机制。一方面,通过弹性治理的方式回应上访人的利益诉求,另一方面,通过政策调整来缩小行政偏差的幅度。对于信访制度功能的研究有助于加深对信访政治意涵和党政体制的认识和理解。The petition system in China has the function of correcting administrative deviations. Incomplete policies and flexible implementation could result in damage to the interests of specific policy recipients. Due to the limitation of case acceptance scope, these disputes are difficult to be resolved through administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation, and then enter the petition system. The petition system and the party-government system take a high-level promotion to resolve conflicts and form a politicized dispute resolution mechanism. On the one hand, the petition system responds to the appeals of petitioners through flexible governance, and on the other hand, the petition system narrow administrative deviations through policy adjustments. The petition system has the function of correcting administrative deviations. The understanding of the petition system function helps to deepen the understanding of the political implications of petition.

关 键 词：行政偏差 党政体制 社会转型 法治建设 

分 类 号：D632.8[政治法律—政治学] D925.3[政治法律—中外政治制度]