行业竞争性、政企互动与产品质量——监管者多重激励的逻辑  

Industry contestability,government-firm interaction,and product quality——under multiple incentives for the regulator

作　　者：李想 贾宝万 丁加齐 XIANG LI;BAOWAN JIA;JIAQI DING(Nanjing Audit University)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学经济学院

出　　处：《产业经济评论》2023年第6期43-66,共24页Review of Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“企业并购决策阶段审计研究:基于改进的数据包络分析”(批准号:71801132);江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目“信息不对称、政企互动与产品质量:多环节监管的情境”(批准号:KYCX21_1834)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：产品质量信息不对称的行业难以避免市场失灵和政府失灵。现有文献较少考察,在受监管的行业中引入市场竞争是否能够反过来改善政府监管,进而提升产品质量、化解两种失灵。对这一问题的回答,有助于深入理解市场在资源配置中的决定性作用以及如何更好发挥政府的作用。本文从地方政府监管者与企业理性互动的视角切入,通过对比完全垄断和双寡头行业的政企博弈发现:地方监管者包庇低质企业的动力既可能来自政绩激励也可能来自租金激励;政绩激励下的包庇行为不会伴随租金交易,而表现出“监管形式化”的特征。与完全垄断行业相比,在行业中引入竞争,将更容易遏制监管形式化和租金交易,进而激励地方严格监管。仅当竞争带来这一“监管激励效应”时才会产生“质控提升效应”,否则反而削弱企业提高产品质量的动力。在短期内,监管激励效应只存在于行业局部范围,全行业实现严格监管的难度并不会因引入竞争而降低;但是长期来看,行业内的竞争有望培育和强化外部监督监察力量,有效形成市场竞争、政府监管和社会监督的合力,进而在全行业实现严格监管,最终提升行业的产品质量。本文的研究有助于理解我国在经济发展不同阶段地方政商关系的特征及其变化,以及美国等西方发达国家在监管领域“放松监管”与“加强监管”并存的历史现象。It is well known that both market failure and government failure may occur in those industries with asymmetric information in product quality.Existing literature seldom explores,however,whether introducing market competition in a regulated industry would in turn improve the regulation itself,and would furthermore rectify both failures with improved product quality.The answer to this question would help us understand the decisive role of the market and how to play a better role for the government in the resource allocation.This paper constructs a dynamic game with asymmetric information between firms and a local regulator with multiple incentives.These incentives include pursuing for political performance appraised by the upper level in the bureaucratic system and for rent revenue paid by firms in the market.By comparing the equilibria in the monopoly industry with the duopoly industry,we find that the local regulator may choose to shelter the firm offering unsafe products either for his political performance or rent revenue.When pursuing for the political performance by sheltering unsafe products,there would be no rent transaction between the local regulator and firms,but“cooking the book”behavior for the regulator occurs.Comparing with the monopoly industry,it becomes easier to suppress both the rent transaction and the“cooking behavior”and thereby to encourage the local regulator to offer strict regulation by introducing competition into that industry.Only if this improvement in regulation occurs can market competition encourage firms to give high quality products.In the short term,the improvement in regulation can only exist“partially”in the industry,which means that the local regulator would still shelter at least one firm’s unsafe products in some occasions and therefore market competition cannot produce strict regulation in the whole industry.In the long term,however,competition in the industry may enhance outside supervision and thereby prevent the local regulator from sheltering unsafe produ

关 键 词：产品质量 行业竞争性 政企互动 监管者激励 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济] F273.2