不同互惠情境下工业共生链企业碳减排博弈行为  

Game behavior to carbon reduction of enterprises in the industrial symbiosis chain under different reciprocal scenario

作　　者：张凯旋 丁黎黎[1] ZHANG Kaixuan;DING Lili(School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学经济学院,青岛266100

出　　处：《资源科学》2023年第10期1947-1960,共14页Resources Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71973132);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(202161046)。

摘　　要：【目的】针对工业共生链企业碳减排动力不足的问题,本文基于互惠偏好理论,探究工业共生链上、下游企业间的博弈决策,以期探明影响工业共生链企业碳减排的因素及其作用效果,从而为政府的环境规制政策提供决策依据。【方法】考虑上、下游企业存在互惠偏好,本文从直接互惠与间接互惠两种情境入手,分别建立政府干预下的工业共生链企业碳减排演化博弈模型,并利用Matlab 2019b软件进行模拟仿真,分析影响因素的敏感性。【结果】研究表明:(1)在政府严格监管时,上、下游企业共生概率增加,反之则减小。(2)直接互惠偏好对工业共生链企业碳减排具有促进作用。相较于收益分配契约,成本分担契约对工业共生链上、下游企业共生的促进作用更显著。(3)间接互惠偏好对工业共生链企业碳减排行为也产生积极影响。成本分担和收益分配契约对上游企业共生策略的影响呈现出差异性,即成本分担超过一定阈值后,上游企业的非共生概率增大,而收益分配的影响与之相反。但是,成本分担和收益分配契约对下游企业共生策略的作用效果并不显著。【结论】研究认为,政府监管、互惠偏好系数、收益分配系数的增加,成本分担系数的减少均会对企业碳减排积极性产生影响。本文从政府有效监管、完善声誉机制和契约设计等方面,提出了促进工业共生链企业互惠合作的相关对策建议,以期更好地激励企业碳减排。[Objective]Aiming at addressing the issue of insufficient enterprises’carbon emission reduction power of industrial symbiosis chain,and based on the reciprocity preference theory,this study explores the game decision making between upstream and downstream enterprises of industrial symbiosis chain.It examines the influencing factors,mechanism,and effect of carbon reduction of industrial symbiosis chain,to provide a decision-making basis for environmental policy makers.[Methods]Considering the reciprocity preference behavior of upstream and downstream enterprises,this paper starts with two scenarios of direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity,an evolutionary game model of industrial symbiosis chain enterprises’emission reduction under government intervention was established.Using the Matlab 2019b software,this study simulates and analyzes the sensitivity of influencing factors.[Results](1)When the government strictly regulates,the symbiosis probability of upstream and downstream enterprises increases,and vice versa.(2)The direct reciprocity preference can promote enterprises’carbon emission reduction of industrial symbiosis chain.Relative income distribution contract and cost sharing contract have more significant promoting effect on the symbiosis of the upstream and downstream enterprises in the industrial symbiosis chain.(3)Indirect reciprocity preference also has a positive impact on carbon emission reduction behavior of industrial symbiosis chain enterprises.The influence of cost-sharing and benefit-sharing contracts on the symbiosis strategy of upstream enterprises is symmetrical,that is,when the cost sharing exceeds a certain threshold,the non-symbiosis probability of upstream enterprises increases,while the impact of benefit-sharing contracts is opposite.However,the effect of cost-sharing and benefit-sharing contracts on downstream enterprises'symbiosis strategy is not significant.[Conclusion]The study concluded that the increase of government regulation,reciprocity preference coefficient and income

关 键 词：工业共生链 碳减排 互惠偏好 直接互惠 间接互惠 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32[环境科学与工程—环境工程] X322