地方“发展型”政府财政压力与补充性融资选择  

Financial Pressure and Supplementary Financing Options of Local“Developmental”Governments

作　　者：刘朝阳[1] 李傲洋 张璐[1,2] LIU Zhaoyang;LI Aoyang;ZHANG Lu(Jilin University,Changchun 130012;College of Humanities&Information Changchun University of Technology,Changchun 130122)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学,吉林长春130012 [2]长春工业大学人文信息学院,吉林长春130122

出　　处：《财贸研究》2023年第10期50-61,84,共13页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“系统性风险防范视角下我国地方财政赤字隐性货币化问题研究”(23YJA790048)。

摘　　要：基于2009—2017年中国285个地级市的土地出让金和城投债数据,采用双向固定效应模型,实证检验“发展型”政府在财政压力作用下的补充性融资选择问题。研究发现:为缓解财政压力,地方“发展型”政府在融资选择上更偏向于土地出让金融资模式;土地出让金对城投债具有显著的“抵押增强”效应,即存在“以地撑债”的自我加强机制;源于“预期担保”效应,土地出让金对城投债违约风险的影响呈现“U”形变化。为破解中国地方政府对土地出让金的过度依赖和隐性债务风险积累的内生性,应加快完成三个转变,即政府职能从“发展型”转向“服务型”、政府投资从看“量”转向重“效”、政府融资从“行政干预”转向“市场”。Based on the land transferring fee and urban investment bond data of 285 prefecture-level cities in China from 2009 to 2017,this paper empirically examines supplementary financing choices of“developmental”governments under the effect of fiscal pressure using a two-way fixed effect model.The results show that,in order to relieve the financial pressure of“developmental”government,local governments prefer the mode of land finance financing.Land finance has a significant“mortgage enhancement”effect on urban investment bonds,that is,there is a self-reinforcing mechanism of“supporting debt with land”.Due to the“expected guarantee”effect,the impact of land finance on the default risk of urban investment bond shows a U-shaped relationship.In order to solve the over-dependence of local governments on land finance and the inherent accumulation of hidden debt risks,the completion of three changes should be accelerated:government function from“development”to“service”,government investment from“quantity”to“efficiency”,government financing from“administrative intervention”to“market”

关 键 词：地方“发展型”政府 财政压力 补充性融资 土地出让金 城投债 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]