平台厂商与政府数据共享行为演化:博弈机制、路径分析与政策形成  

Evolution of Data Sharing Behaviors between Platform Firms and the Government:Game Mechanism,Path Analysis and Policy Formation

作　　者：冯振华 裴馨 Feng Zhenhua;Pei Xin(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384;School of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715)

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384 [2]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《管理评论》2023年第10期175-187,共13页Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BJL114)。

摘　　要：数据共享是充分释放数据资源价值的必经之路。本文以打通政府和平台厂商数据流通渠道,推进数据共享为出发点,构建平台厂商和政府之间的演化博弈模型,研究二者在博弈过程中的策略选择,并模拟分析不同情形下平台厂商和政府的演化稳定策略均衡点,探究数据转化能力、监督成本、共享成本等因素变动对平台厂商共享行为的影响。研究发现:当提高平台厂商和政府的社会声誉系数、减小政府经济收益分配系数以及加大平台厂商数据共享量时,能够使系统分别从“最劣”“无效”和“不良”状态演化至“理想”状态,最终实现平台厂商和政府的双重帕累托最优;当平台厂商和政府数据转化能力存在差异时,只有政府数据转化能力强于平台厂商数据转化能力时,才会明显促进数据共享行为选择;同时,数据转化能力提升、监督成本提高也会促使平台厂商选择共享;但共享成本的提高会延缓或抑制平台厂商数据共享行为。最后,本文据此提出相应政策建议。Data sharing is a critical way to fully release the value of data resources.This paper starts from opening up data circulation channels between the government and platform manufacturers and promoting data sharing,constructs an evolutionary game model between platform firms and the government,studies the strategic choices of the two in the game process,simulates the equilibrium point of the evolutionary stable strategy between them in different situations,and explores the influence of data transformation ability,supervision cost,sharing cost and other factors on the sharing behaviors of platform firms.The study finds that when the social reputation coefficients of platform firms and the government increases,the distribution coefficient of government economic benefits declines,and the amount of data shared by platform firms rises,the system can evolve from“worst”,“ineffective”and“bad”states to the“ideal”state respectively,and finally achieve the Pareto optimality of both platform firms and the government;where there exists differences in the data conversion capability of platform firms and the government,only when the government has a significantly stronger data conversion capability than platform firms,will the choice of data sharing behaviors be significantly promoted;at the same time,the improvement of data conversion capability and the increase of supervision cost will also prompt platform firms to choose sharing;however the rise of sharing cost will delay or inhibit the data sharing behaviors of platform firms.Finally,this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.

关 键 词：数据共享 友好合作 演化博弈 路径分析 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] D63[政治法律—政治学]