美元本位下的央行间货币政策博弈与福利分析  被引量:1

Analysis of International Monetary Policy ObjectivesGame and Social Welfare under the Dollar Standard

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作  者:石峰 王忏 龚六堂[3] Shi Feng;Wang Chan;Gong Liutang(Business School,Beijing Language and Culture University;School of Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics;Guanghua School of Management,Peking University)

机构地区:[1]北京语言大学商学院 [2]中央财经大学金融学院 [3]北京大学光华管理学院

出  处:《经济科学》2023年第6期28-47,共20页Economic Science

基  金:北京语言大学院级项目(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金)(项目编号:23YJ090007)的资助;国家自然科学基金面上项目“人工智能、劳动市场结构与货币政策”(项目编号:72373174)的资助;国家社会科学基金重大项目“实质性减税降费与高质量发展”(项目编号:19ZDA069)的资助。

摘  要:本文构建一个包含美元本位的两国开放经济模型,引入货币政策多目标框架,探究政策博弈对两国福利的影响。两国可选择政策目标变量包括:价格水平(PPI通胀或CPI通胀)、实际产出与名义汇率波动。研究发现:第一,货币政策合作时,政策目标变量的选择差异并不影响两国福利;不合作时,不同政策目标变量下的社会福利具有明显区别;将实际产出作为政策目标变量构成不合作博弈的纳什均衡。第二,美元本位增强了美联储操纵贸易条件的能力,使得美国在货币政策不合作时的福利高于合作,所以美国有强烈动机不参与政策合作,并执行“以邻为壑”的货币政策。第三,扩大对外开放程度,有助于缓解美元本位下人民币流动性约束对中国福利的不利影响。This paper constructs a two-country open economic model featuring dollar standard,and introduces the multi-target framework of monetary policy into it,to investigate the effects of the policy game on the two countries’social welfare.The available policy target variables include the price level(PPI inflation and CPI inflation),real output,and fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate.We obtain the following research results.Firstly,in the case of monetary policy cooperation,the heterogeneity in the choices of policy target variables does not change the welfare consequences in the two countries.However,this is not true in the Nash game.The Nash equilibrium involves the real output as target variables.Secondly,the dollar standard increases the Federal Reserve’s ability to manipulate the terms of trade,and the welfare of the US is greater under non-cooperation than that under policy coordination.Hence,the Fed has a strong incentive to engage in non-cooperation,and conduct the beggar-thy-neighbor monetary policy.Thirdly,increasing the degree of openness is an effective way to mitigate the negative impact of renminbi’s liquidity constraint under the dollar standard system on China’s social welfare.

关 键 词:美元本位 货币政策博弈 政策目标变量 纳什均衡 社会福利 

分 类 号:F831.6[经济管理—金融学]

 

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