新冠疫情背景下港航运输链横向合谋稳定性  

Horizontal collusion stability of transport chain consisting of ports and ship companies under background of COVID-19

作　　者：余琛 董岗[1] YU Chen;DONG Gang(School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2023年第4期91-98,共8页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(22YJA630013)。

摘　　要：后疫情时代,港口拥堵加剧,航运联盟竞争日益激烈,双方都易形成内部横向合谋。为探究港航运输链上游港口横向合谋与下游船公司横向合谋间的相互作用,构建一个无限次重复博弈模型,分析港口(船公司)横向合谋对船公司(港口)横向合谋的动机及其稳定性的影响。通过数值分析探究港口拥堵造成的供应链失衡的影响。研究结果表明:当港口和船公司都合谋时,托运人的利益达到最低;下游船公司合谋会降低上游港口合谋稳定性,上游港口合谋会降低下游船公司合谋稳定性;随着拥堵成本上升,合谋稳定性呈上升趋势。In the post-epidemic era,port congestion intensifies,and the competition among shipping alliances become increasingly fierce,and ports and shipping companies are prone to internal horizontal collusion.In order to explore the interaction between the horizontal collusion of upstream ports and the horizontal collusion of downstream shipping companies in the transport chain consisting of ports and ship companies,an infinite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the influence of the horizontal collusion of ports(shipping companies)on the motivation and stability of the horizontal collusion of shipping companies(ports).Through numerical analysis,the influence of supply chain imbalance caused by port congestion is explored.The study results show that:the shippers interests reach the lowest value when both the ports and the shipping companies collude;the collusion of downstream shipping companies can reduce the collusion stability of upstream ports,and the collusion of upstream ports can reduce the collusion stability of downstream shipping companies;as the congestion cost rises,the collusion stability tends to rise.

关 键 词：后疫情时代 横向合谋 拥堵成本 合谋稳定性 

分 类 号：F552.6[经济管理—产业经济]