从“主动负债”到“被动负债”:中央监管转变下的隐性债务扩张变化  

From"Active Leveraging"to"Passive Leveraging":Contingent Local Government Debt Expansion under Transforming Regulations of the Central Government

作　　者：聂卓 刘松瑞 玄威 NIE Zhuo;Liu Songrui;Xuan Wei(University of International Business and Economics;Renmin University of China;University of Southern California)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院 [2]中国人民大学应用经济学院 [3]美国南加利福尼亚大学经济学系

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2023年第6期2136-2155,共20页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(22QD31)的资助

摘　　要：中国地方债扩张受地方政府激励推动,而地方政府激励的作用方向受中央监管导向的塑造。本文发现,2015年前后中央监管导向趋严,地方隐性债务的扩张模式由“主动负债”转向“被动负债”。“主动负债”模式主要由地方政府激励驱动,以基础设施建设为主要用途。“被动负债”模式主要由地方政府偿债压力驱动,以借新还旧为主要用途。对隐性债务风险的分析表明,这一转变遇制了债务存量的扩张,但是债务利息成本与偿债可持续性仍然具有一定风险。Local government debt expansion in China is driven by the incentive of local governments,while the specific relationship between them is shaped by regulations of the central government.We find that around 2015,the central regulatory guidance became stricter,and the expansion mode of contingent local government debts changed from"active leveraging"to"passive leveraging".The"active leveraging"mode is mainly driven by local government incentives,with infrastructure construction as the main purpose.The"passive leveraging"mode is mainly driven by the pressure of local governments to repay debts,and its main purpose is refinancing.The analysis of contingent local debt risk shows that this change has restrained the expansion of debt stock,but there are still some risks in debt interest cost and debt repayment sustainability.

关 键 词：地方政府隐性债务 中央监管导向 地方政府激励 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]