电商平台掐尖式并购的反垄断规制:理论澄清与制度因应  

Antitrust Regulation of E-commerce Platform Pinch-point Mergers and Acquisitions:Theoretical Clarification and Institutional Response

作　　者：蒋淼 丁国峰 JIANG Miao;DING Guo-feng(Law School of Anhui University,Hefei 230601,Anhui,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学法学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《中国流通经济》2023年第12期49-58,共10页China Business and Market

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“数字经济时代大数据市场限制竞争行为法律规制研究”(20BFX149)。

摘　　要：电商平台掐尖式并购初创企业已成为数字经济领域企业并购的全新样态,不同于扼杀式并购横向层面对潜在竞争对手的绝对消除,电商平台出于获取数据资源、拓宽业务领域、排除潜在威胁的战略目标而实施的掐尖式并购并不必然导致被并购企业的消失。尽管如此,电商平台掐尖式并购还是引起社会对竞争损害的担忧,而现代反垄断法以维护市场公平竞争、鼓励创新和提升消费者福利为立法目标,与电商平台掐尖式并购的规制逻辑不谋而合。但营业额申报门槛的失灵、实质性审查无效化困境以及反垄断事后监督权几近悬置,使得反垄断法在规制电商平台掐尖式并购时力所不及。为有效规制电商平台的掐尖式并购,应明确“营业额+交易额”的复合申报标准,以矫正事前申报失灵的困境;确立以非价格要素为核心的审查框架,引入竞争损害举证责任倒置规则,重塑实质性审查机制;在常态化监管理念下适度发挥自由裁量权,对监督受托人制度予以改进和完善,以强化对电商平台掐尖式并购的事后监管。The e-commerce platform's pinch-point merger and acquisition(M&A)of start-ups has become a new pattern of corporate M&A in the field of digital economy.Different from the absolute elimination of potential competitors at the horizontal level of killer acquisitions,e-commerce platforms implement pinch-point M&A for the purpose of obtaining data resources,or expanding business areas,or eliminating strategic choices of potential threats,but that doesn't mean that enterprises being involved in M&A will be wiped out.In spite of this,the e-commerce platform's pinch-point M&A still cause social concerns about competition damage.The modern antitrust law aims to maintain fair competition in the market,encourage innovation and improve consumer welfare,which coincides with the regulatory logic of e-commerce platforms'pinch-point M&A.However,the failure of the declaration threshold for"revenue",the dilemma of invalidation of substantive review,and the almost suspended post monopoly supervision power make the antitrust law insufficient in regulating the e-commerce platform's pinchpoint M&A.In order to effectively regulate the pinch-point M&A of e-commerce platforms,the composite declaration standard of"turnover+transaction volume"should be clarified to correct the dilemma of pre-declaration failure;taking the non-price factors as the core of the review framework should be established,the rules of reversing the burden of proof of competition injury should be introduced,and the substantive review mechanism should be reshaped;and under the concept of normal supervision,the discretionary power should be appropriately exercised to improve and perfect the supervision trustee system,so as to strengthen the post-supervision of the e-commerce platform's pinch-point M&A.

关 键 词：电商平台 掐尖式并购 反垄断 法治 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]