Side-Channel Analysis for the Re-Keying Protocol of Bluetooth Low Energy  

作　　者：曹培 张驰 陆相君 陆海宁 谷大武 Pei Cao;Chi Zhang;Xiang-Jun Lu;Hai-Ning Lu;Da-Wu Gu(School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)

机构地区：[1]School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China

出　　处：《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》2023年第5期1132-1148,共17页计算机科学技术学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.62072307。

摘　　要：In the era of the Internet of Things,Bluetooth low energy(BLE/BTLE)plays an important role as a wellknown wireless communication technology.While the security and privacy of BLE have been analyzed and fixed several times,the threat of side-channel attacks to BLE devices is still not well understood.In this work,we highlight a side-channel threat to the re-keying protocol of BLE.This protocol uses a fixed long term key for generating session keys,and the leakage of the long term key could render the encryption of all the following(and previous)connections useless.Our attack exploits the side-channel leakage of the re-keying protocol when it is implemented on embedded devices.In particular,we present successful correlation electromagnetic analysis and deep learning based profiled analysis that recover long term keys of BLE devices.We evaluate our attack on an ARM Cortex-M4 processor(Nordic Semiconductor nRF52840)running Nimble,a popular open-source BLE stack.Our results demonstrate that the long term key can be recovered within only a small amount of electromagnetic traces.Further,we summarize the features and limitations of our attack,and suggest a range of countermeasures to prevent it.

关 键 词：Bluetooth low energy(BLE/BTLE) long term key re-keying protocol side-channel analysis 

分 类 号：TN92[电子电信—通信与信息系统]