基于演化博弈的老旧小区改造项目利益分配研究  

Research on Benefit Distribution of Old Residential Areas Renovation Project Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：熊华平[1] 严子璇 王卫来 薛国著 XIONG Huaping;YAN Zixuan;WANG Weilai;XUE Guozhu(School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430065,China;China Construction Second Engineering Bureau Ltd,Beijing 100160,China;School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430065 [2]中国建筑第二工程局有限公司,北京100160 [3]武汉理工大学土木工程与建筑学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《建筑经济》2023年第12期73-80,共8页Construction Economy

基　　金：湖北省教育厅社会科学研究重点项目(20D014);武汉科技大学人文社会科学高水平项目(W201906)。

摘　　要：通过构建政府部门、开发商、居民的三方动态演化博弈模型,分析利益相关者在不同情况下的进化稳定策略(ESS);通过仿真分析,探究政府奖励力度系数、可变成本节约系数、增量收益分成系数对利益相关者演化稳定策略的影响;最后提出建立财政奖励、保持沟通渠道畅通、建立居民参与的增量收益分享机制等政策建议,以期为制定科学合理的老旧小区改造项目利益分配机制提供一定理论参考。This paper analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy(ESS)of stakeholders in different situations by constructing a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model of government departments,developers and residents.Through simulation analysis,the influence of government reward coefficient,variable cost saving coefficient and incremental revenue sharing coefficient on the evolutionary stability strategy of stakeholders is explored.Finally,it puts forward policy suggestions such as establishing financial incentives,maintaining communication channels open,and establishing an incremental revenue sharing mechanism for residents to participate,in order to provide a theoretical reference for formulating a scientific and reasonable benefit distribution mechanism for old residential areas renovation projects.

关 键 词：演化博弈 老旧小区改造 利益分配 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济] F299.23