CEO股价崩盘经历与企业创新  

CEO Stock Price Crash Experience and Corporate Innovation

作　　者：林春培[1] 曾志盛 朱晓艳 余传鹏[2] LIN Chun-pei;ZENG Zhi-sheng;ZHU Xiao-yan;YU Chuan-peng

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021 [2]华南理工大学旅游管理系,广东广州510006

出　　处：《华侨大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第1期59-75,共17页Journal of Huaqiao University(Philosophy & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71974059);华侨大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(22SKGC-QT03);后疫情时代福建中小企业数字化开放式创新对企业敏捷性的影响研究(JAS22014)。

摘　　要：基于风险规避假说和感觉适应定律,分析了CEO股价崩盘经历与企业创新之间的关系,并讨论了外部环境(融资约束)和内部资源(组织冗余)对两者关系的调节作用。利用2007-2017年A股上市公司数据,得到以下研究结论:CEO股价崩盘经历抑制了企业创新;在外部环境融资约束程度越高的企业中,CEO股价崩盘经历对企业创新的负向作用越强;在组织内部冗余资源越充裕的企业中,CEO股价崩盘经历对企业创新的负向作用越强。且在进行相关稳健性检验后,上述结论仍然成立。研究结论对于上市公司制定科学合理CEO聘任制度、加强公司治理及推动CEO发起并实施企业创新具有重要参考与启示意义。Based on the risk aversion hypothesis and the law of sensory adaptation,this paper analyzes the relationship between CEO stock price crash experience and corporateinnovation,and discusses the moderating effects of relationship between external environment(financing constraint)and internal resources(organizational redundancy).Using data from A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017,the following research conclusions were obtained:The experience of CEO stock price crash inhibits corporate innovation;In companies with higher external financing constraints and more abundant internal redundant resources,the negative impact of CEO stock price crash experience on corporate innovation is stronger.After the robustness test,the above conclusion still holds.The research conclusions have important reference and enlightenment significance for listed companies to formulate scientific and reasonable CEO appointment system,strengthen corporate governance and promote CEO to initiate and implement corporate innovation.

关 键 词：CEO股价崩盘经历 企业创新 融资约束 组织冗余 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]