邻避设施规划中利益相关者行为演化博弈分析  

Game analysis of stakeholder behavior evolution in NIMBY facilities planning

作　　者：闫盛华 陈为公 YAN Shenghua;CHEN Weigong(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,山东青岛266520

出　　处：《扬州大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第6期18-26,共9页Journal of Yangzhou University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72001121)。

摘　　要：为预防风险聚集类邻避设施规划建设引发的邻避冲突问题,以博弈主体有限理性为前提,建立“政府-企业-公众”之间的演化博弈模型,分析三方主体的演化稳定性.在此基础上,以最优策略为假设条件,运用MATLAB 2020a软件进行仿真模拟,分析系统达到最优状态的影响因素.研究结果表明,政府积极监督的成本、企业不考虑公众利益诉求时受到的惩罚、政府对公众参与的激励等对参与主体的策略选择具有重要影响.据此,基于政府、企业、公众三方视角提出推动利益主体向{政府积极监督,投资企业考虑公众诉求,公众参与决策}均衡点演化的相关建议,为解决利益冲突问题和推动城市化发展提供参考.To prevent avoidance NIMBY conflicts arising from the planning and construction of riskaggregating NIMBY facilities,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model among"government-enterprise-public"based on the premise of limited rationality of game subjects,and analyses the evolutionary stability of the three subjects.On this basis,taking the optimal strategy as the assumption condition,MATLAB 2020a software is used to simulate and analyze the influencing factors of the system to reach the optimal state.The results show that the cost of government active supervision,the punishment for the enterprises when they do not consider public interests demands,and the incentive of government to public participation have an important impact on the strategic choice of participants.Therefore,based on the perspectives of the government,enterprises and the public,relevant suggestions are put forward to promote the stakeholders to actively supervise,consider and participate in the evolution of the equilibrium point,so as to provide reference for solving the problem of conflict of interest and promoting the development of urbanization.

关 键 词：利益相关者 演化博弈 风险聚集类邻避设施 演化稳定策略 数值仿真 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]