考虑企业社会责任的零售商回收型闭环供应链决策与协调研究  

Decision and Coordination of the Retailer Recycling Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Corporate Social Responsibility

作　　者：唐娟 李帮义[1] 龚本刚[2] 刘志[2] 朱晓东[3] TANG Juan;LI Bang-yi;GONG Ben-gang;LIU Zhi;ZHU Xiao-dong(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;College of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China;School of Management Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science Technology,Nanjing 210044,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [3]南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏南京210044

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第11期228-237,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71901002,71801003,72071002);教育部人文社会科学青年项目(18YJC630110);安徽省高等学校杰出青年资助项目(2023AH020016);安徽省高校自然科学重点研究项目(KJ2019A0138)。

摘　　要：本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任并委托零售商回收废旧产品的闭环供应链产品定价、社会责任努力水平和回收率的决策问题,探讨基于Nash讨价还价的收益共享契约和两部定价契约对零售商回收型闭环供应链的协调效果。研究结果表明:制造商将废旧产品再利用所获得成本节约全部转移给零售商,可实现分散决策下企业社会责任水平、废旧产品回收率、成员及系统利润的最大化;基于讨价还价的收益共享契约能够部分协调闭环供应链,其协调效果与闭环供应链领导者的议价能力正相关;两部定价契约能够完全协调闭环供应链,合适的特许经营费用收取能够促使该契约成为闭环供应链成员的共同选择。Aiming at a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)in which a manufacturer holds corporate social responsibility(CSR)and commits the collection of used products to the retailer,a centralized and a decentral⁃ized decision-making models are constructed to study the optimal pricing of new products,CSR investment,and collection rate decision-making issues,and the impact of the transfer price of used products on the equilibrium decisions and profit of each player in the CLSC is discussed.Then,a revenue sharing contract model based on Nash bargaining and a two-part tariff contract model are constructed,and the coordination effect of the two contracts is explored considering the influence of the manufacturer’s bargaining power,unit cost sav⁃ings from recycling,consumers’sensitivity coefficient on the CSR effort level and CSR investment scale coef⁃ficient,and then the advantage of two contracts is compared from the economic perspective of different channel players.Results show that if the manufacturer transfers all cost savings from recycling used products to the retailer,the CSR performance,collection rate,the profits of each player and channel can be maximized in a decentralized-decision situation without coordination contract.The revenue sharing contract based on Nash bargaining can attain partial coordination and the coordination effect increases in the bargaining power of the leader of the CLSC.The two-part tariff contract can coordinate the CLSC completely,and appropriate fixed fees can make the two-part tariff contract become a common choice of the players compared to the revenue shar⁃ing contract.However,when the economic benefit of the manufacturer’s CSR commitment is beyond a certain threshold,the difficulty of complete coordination of the two-part tariff contract increases(decreases)in the CSR investment scale coefficient(consumers’sensitivity coefficient on the CSR effort level).

关 键 词：闭环供应链 企业社会责任 定价决策 收益共享契约 两部定价契约 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]