公办养老机构与政府补贴的民办养老机构间博弈模型研究  

Research on Game Model Between Public and Private Elderly Care Institutions Based on Government Subsidies

作　　者：姜一帆 陆媛媛[1] JIANG Yi-fan;LU Yuan-yuan(College of Mathematics,Jilin Normal University,Siping 136000,China)

机构地区：[1]吉林师范大学数学学院,吉林四平136000

出　　处：《长春师范大学学报》2023年第12期18-27,共10页Journal of Changchun Normal University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于学习效应的资源分配排序问题研究”(71501082)。

摘　　要：基于博弈论思想,针对政府补贴的民办养老机构老人的情况,构建了公办养老机构与民办养老机构两者之间的博弈模型.分别进行Stackelberg主从博弈与Nash博弈,确定公办养老机构与民办养老机构的最优定价和最优服务水平,分析补贴金额对最优决策的影响,从两种博弈模型及两种养老机构两个角度进行对比研究,为养老服务行业的协调发展提供理论参考.Based on the idea of game theory,this paper constructs a game model between public and private pension institutions,aiming at the situation that the government subsidizes the elderly in private pension institutions.The Stackelberg game and Nash master-slave game are used to determine the optimal pricing and service level of public and private pension institutions,and the influence of subsidy amount on the optimal decision-making is analyzed,this paper makes a comparative study on the two game models and the two pension institutions,which provides a theoretical reference for the coordinated development of the pension service industry.

关 键 词：基准补贴 养老机构 STACKELBERG博弈 Nash博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]