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作 者:何洋 路尧 李志恒 杨萌 尹硕 李迁 姜欣 HE Yang;LU Yao;LI Zhiheng;YANG Meng;YIN Shuo;LI Qian;JIANG Xin(State Grid Henan Electric Power Trading Center Co.,Ltd.,Zhengzhou 450018;State Gird Henan Electrics Power Company Economic Research Institute,Zhengzhou 450052;School of Electrical Engineering,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001)
机构地区:[1]国网河南省电力交易中心有限公司,郑州450018 [2]国网河南省电力公司经济技术研究院,郑州450052 [3]郑州大学电气工程学院,郑州450001
出 处:《电气工程学报》2023年第4期278-287,共10页Journal of Electrical Engineering
基 金:国网河南省电力公司科技资助项目(5217L0210003)。
摘 要:电网侧储能电站可以更好地发挥集群效应,促进新能源的消纳,但规模化应用又极易形成联盟产生市场力,不利于市场发展。节点边际电价在理论和实践中已经被证实无法同时满足市场出清时激励相容、个体理性和社会福利最大化对能源定价机制的要求。因此,基于维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves,VCG)机制设计理论,提出一种电网侧储能电站参与市场的能源定价机制,降低市场力的影响作用,发现储能电站最大价值。首先,以购电成本最小为目标建立综合考虑储能成本的日前市场出清模型;其次,提出基于VCG机制设计理论的电网侧储能电站定价机制,促进其理性报价、实现电力资源优化配置,并通过理论证明所提机制具有激励相容、个体理性和社会福利最大化的市场性质;最后,基于改进的IEEE 30节点系统进行实证分析,验证了该机制有效降低市场力,克服了节点边际电价能源定价机制下电网侧储能联盟的战略竞价行为,实现了市场社会福利最大化和有效的日前市场运作。The grid-side energy storage power stations can better exert the cluster effect and promote the consumption of new energy.But the large-scale application can easily form an alliance to generate market power,which is not conducive to market development.It has been proved in theory and practice that the node marginal electricity price cannot meet the requirements of incentive compatibility,individual rationality and social welfare maximization for energy pricing mechanism at the same time when the market clears.Therefore,based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)mechanism design theory,an energy pricing mechanism is proposed for grid-side energy storage power stations to participate in the market to reduce the impact of market power and discover the greatest value of energy storage power plants.Firstly,a day-ahead market clearing model that comprehensively considers the cost of energy storage is established with the goal of minimizing the purchase cost of electricity.Secondly,a bidding mechanism for grid-side energy storage power stations based on the VCG mechanism design theory is proposed to promote rational quotation,achieve optimal allocation of power resources.And it is theoretically proved that the proposed mechanism has the market attributes of incentive compatibility,individual rationality and social welfare maximization.Finally,empirical analysis is carried out based on the improved IEEE 30 node system,it is verified that the mechanism effectively reduces market power and this mechanism overcomes the strategic bidding behavior of the grid side energy storage alliance under the nodal marginal price energy pricing mechanism,and realizes the maximization of market social welfare and effective day-ahead market operation.
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