城市数字治理:一个博弈制度分析框架  

Urban Digital Governance:An Institution Framework of Game Theory

作　　者：程艳[1] 黄容艳 Cheng Yan;Huang Rongyan

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学经济学院、商务部国内贸易智库浙江工商大学现代商贸研究中心 [2]浙江工商大学经济学院

出　　处：《治理研究》2023年第6期100-112,159,160,共15页Governance Studies

基　　金：教育部规划基金项目“流通成本变动与制造业空间集聚:基于地方保护主义的理论与实践”(编号:18YJA790015);杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题“浙江制造业集聚效益与流通成本变动的经验研究”(编号:M23JC050)。

摘　　要：数字经济改变了城市治理主体权力结构配置及利益配置,推动形成了主体博弈均衡结果的多样性。城市数字治理博弈关系主要包括政府与城市居民的博弈、政府与企业的博弈,博弈均衡结果取决于治理主体权责配置关系重新界定的程度,政府需要权衡各类组织成本以寻找适应性治理边界。考虑到制度路径依赖的约束,主体权力结构相较市场行为更为固化,城市数字治理更应关注数据算法引发的治理风险而非市场行为规制,政府培育与技术发展水平适配的制度安排才能有效发挥城市数字治理的积极作用。The digital economy has transformed the configuration of interests and power structures in urban governance,promoting diversity in the outcomes of the game between different participants.The key relationships in urban digital governance include the game between the government and urban residents,and the game between the government and firms.The equilibrium outcome of these games depends on the extent to which the rights and responsibilities of governance entities are redefined.Governments need to balance various organizational costs to find an adaptive governance boundary.Considering the constraints of institutional path dependence,the power structure among urban governance entities is more rigid compared to market behavior. Governance risks triggered by data algorithmsshould be given greater consideration rather than market behavior regulation in urban digital governance.Governments must establish and develop institutional arrangements that are compatible with the level of technologicaldevelopment to effectively harness the positive effects of urban digital governance.

关 键 词：城市治理 博弈论 治理制度 数字治理 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] D035[政治法律—政治学]