The History of the Concept of“Truth-Making”  

作　　者：Nikolay Milkov 

机构地区：[1]University of Paderborn,Paderborn,Germany

出　　处：《Journal of Philosophy Study》2023年第10期449-461,共13页哲学研究（英文版）

摘　　要：The conception of truth-making,albeit in a rudimentary form,could already be discerned in the writings of G.E.Moore and E.Husserl in the early 1900s.A few years later it was more extensively exploited by William James.It was Wittgenstein,however,who gave the concept a precise meaning.In 1913/1914 Wittgenstein advanced a theory of possible worlds,only one of which was real.Every proposition suggests a part of a possible world which does or does not correspond to parts of the real world.In the first case the proposition is true,in the second case false.Moreover,the part of the real world makes the sentence true.This part is a truth-maker,and the sentence is a truth-bearer.Surprisingly enough,Wittgenstein’s concept of truth-making had its family resemblance with William James’s conception of truth.In 1915 Wittgenstein stopped using the concept of truth-making-it was also not mentioned in the Tractatus.Unfortunately,Russell did not notice this and in 1918 he adopted the concept of truth-making.In the 1930s,it was used by some second generation analytic philosophers(Schlick,Stebbing,and Wisdom).However,it became rather popular among analytic philosophers only in the 1980s.

关 键 词：James RUSSELL truth truth-making WITTGENSTEIN 

分 类 号：H31[语言文字—英语]