基于谈判博弈的三峡梯级蓄水期多目标调度  

Multi-objective scheduling of Three Gorges reservoir cascade in impounding period based on negotiation game

作　　者：李英海[1,2] 兰回归 王永强[4] 张海荣 李赟洁 何良哲 LI Yinghai;LAN Huigui;WANG Yongqiang;ZHANG Hairong;LI Yunjie;HE Liangzhe(College of Hydraulic&Environmental Engineering,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China;Hubei Key Laboratory of Construction and Management in Hydropower Engineering,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China;Jingjiang Bureau of Hydrology and Water Resources Survey,Changjiang Water Resources Commission,Yidu 443000,China;Water Resources Department,Yangtze River Scientific Research Institute,Wuhan 430010,China;Hubei Key Laboratory of Intelligent Yangtze and Hydroelectric Science,China Yangtze Power Co.,Ltd.,Yichang 443000,China)

机构地区：[1]三峡大学水利与环境学院,湖北宜昌443002 [2]水电工程施工与管理湖北省重点实验室(三峡大学),湖北宜昌443002 [3]长江水利委员会水文局荆江水文水资源勘测局,湖北宜都443000 [4]长江科学院水资源综合利用研究所,武汉430010 [5]智慧长江与水电科学湖北省重点实验室(中国长江电力股份有限公司),湖北宜昌443000

出　　处：《水力发电学报》2024年第1期1-10,共10页Journal of Hydroelectric Engineering

基　　金：长江科学院开放研究基金项目(CKWV2021889/KY);智慧长江与水电科学湖北省重点实验室开放基金(242202000903);国家自然科学基金项目(52179018)。

摘　　要：汛后蓄水期是三峡梯级防洪向兴利调度转换的重要时间窗口,不合理的蓄水调度将对梯级防洪、发电兴利、生态效益造成不利影响。本文以发电量最大、防洪库容占用比最小以及修正流量偏差最小作为三峡梯级蓄水期调度目标构建优化调度模型,进而引入谈判博弈模型将各个调度目标作为不同谈判主体,通过逐步缩减各调度目标期望效益值进行多轮谈判,最终得到纳什均衡调度方案。实例计算表明,应用谈判博弈模型能够求解得出三峡梯级蓄水期不同调度主体的最优蓄水调度方案,同时该蓄水调度方案也能够达到其他调度主体期望效益值,被其他目标主体所接受。研究成果可为三峡梯级多目标调度决策提供新的思路。Reservoir impounding period is an important time window for the Three Gorges cascade hydraulic projects to switch from the mode of flood control to benefit operation.However,unreasonable water storage will have adverse effects on cascade flood control,power generation,and ecological benefits.In this paper,an impoundment dispatching model for this reservoir cascade is constructed to optimize the objectives of maximum power generation,minimum occupancy ratio of flood control capacity,and minimum Amended Annual Proportional Flow Deviation.And a negotiation game model is adopted to take each scheduling objective as a different negotiating subject.Then,through multiple rounds of negotiations by gradually reducing the expected benefit value of each scheduling objective,we obtain a Nash equilibrium scheduling scheme.A case study shows that we can obtain an optimal impoundment scheduling scheme for each of the objective subjects of the cascade by applying the game model,while keeping the scheduling schemes satisfying the expected benefits of the other objectives.This is a new useful approach to the cascade’s multi-objective scheduling and decision-making.

关 键 词：三峡梯级 蓄水期 多目标调度 博弈论 谈判博弈 

分 类 号：TV697[水利工程—水利水电工程]