安全生产服务机构参与的建筑安全监管演化博弈  

Evolutionary game of construction safety supervision involved by work safety service provider

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作  者:陈述[1,2] 尹佳 邵波[1,2] 陈云[1,2] 王越[3] CHEN Shu;YIN Jia;SHAO Bo;CHEN Yun;WANG Yue(Hubei Key Laboratory of Construction and Management in Hydropower Engineering,China Three Gorges University,Yichang Hubei 443002,China;College of Hydraulic&Environmental Engineering,China Three Gorges University,Yichang Hubei 443002,China;Central South China Municipal Engineering Design Institute Co.,Ltd.,Wuhan Hubei 430014,China)

机构地区:[1]三峡大学水电工程施工与管理湖北省重点实验室,湖北宜昌443002 [2]三峡大学水利与环境学院,湖北宜昌443002 [3]中国市政工程中南设计总院有限公司,湖北武汉430014

出  处:《中国安全科学学报》2023年第12期8-15,共8页China Safety Science Journal

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助(52079073,72204141)。

摘  要:为改善建筑安全生产过程中事故多发现状,剖析引入安全生产中介服务可能存在的寻租现象,综合运用博弈论,建立建筑企业、安全生产服务机构和政府监管部门之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析三方行为演化特征,仿真模拟博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性。结果表明:建筑企业与安全生产服务机构执行安全管理的成本过高,会使其选择不利于建筑项目安全管理的行为策略,合理控制其维修整改和安全管理投入的成本,会使其积极主动落实安全管理策略;政府部门在监管过程当中,应将管理的重心放在安全生产服务机构上,加强对机构行为的规制,引导建设企业按章办事,这有助于在节约成本投入的同时达到规制双方行为的目的;激励公众对建筑安全监管的积极参与,增加企业的寻租成本和机构的投机成本,有助于引导监督建筑企业、安全生产服务机构行为趋于规范。This study aims to improve the current situation of high incidence of accidents in the process of construction work safety.The possible rent-seeking phenomenon of introducing the intermediary services for work safety was analyzed.By applying the method of game theory,a 3-party evolutionary game model was established among construction enterprises,work safety service providers and government regulators.The evolutionary characteristics of the 3-party behaviors were analyzed,and the stability of the equilibrium point in the game system was simulated.The results show that the high cost of implementing safety management makes the construction enterprises and work safety service providers choose behavior strategies that are not conducive to the safety management of construction projects.Reasonable control of the maintenance and rectification costs and the safety management inputs enables them to actively implement safety management strategies.In the process of supervision,the government should focus on work safety service providers,strengthening the regulation of the providers'behaviour,and guide the construction enterprises to act in accordance with the rules,which is conductive to achieving the goal of regulating the behaviour of both sides while saving costs and inputs.Simulating the public to actively participate in the supervision of construction safety and increasing the rent-seeking costs of enterprises and the speculative costs of providers can well guide the supervision of construction enterprises and work safety service providers to standardize their behaviour.

关 键 词:安全生产服务机构 建筑安全监管 建筑企业 演化博弈 寻租成本 

分 类 号:X923[环境科学与工程—安全科学]

 

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