双寡头数字平台竞争中基于卖家是否多归属的三级价格歧视  

Third-degree Price Discrimination Based on Sellers’Homing Choices in Duopoly Competition between Digital Platforms

作　　者：朱峰 李国鹏 曹志刚 ZHU Feng;LI Guopeng;CAO Zhigang(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;School of Economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第11期26-32,I0003-I0009,共14页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(B23YJS00140);北京市自然科学基金重点项目(Z220001);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72271016)。

摘　　要：本文建立了一个卖家和买家具有偏好异质性的双寡头数字平台的竞争模型。研究了卖家和买家均可以选择多归属(即加入两家平台)的情况下,平台基于卖家是否选择多归属对其进行三级价格歧视对社会福利以及平台定价策略的影响。研究发现该三级价格歧视会导致卖家剩余增加,但是买家剩余和社会总福利都会降低。主要原因在于价格歧视使双寡头平台对卖家的竞争更激烈,从而降低了平台针对卖家的定价。这种三级价格歧视还会改变平台针对卖家、买家的定价策略,导致倾斜定价现象出现:两家平台针对卖家的定价均降低、针对买家的定价均增加的同时还会使加入两家平台的卖家和买家数量均减少。当卖家和买家非对称或平台提供服务在任意异质性水平时,上述结论具有稳健性。The digital economy has become an increasingly pivotal sector in the growth trajectory of China’s overall economy.Digital platforms serve as the principal arenas for transactions within this digital economy,effectively acting as its backbone.While the implementation of stringent antitrust regulations has increasingly limited the capacity of these platforms to openly enforce exclusivity contracts,digital platforms still retain the ability to subtly influence users through the traditional economic tactic of discriminatory pricing.This approach is more covert.This paper aims to investigate the impact of price discrimination by digital platforms,particularly targeting sellers based on their affiliations,as a more covert means of influencing user behavior.This paper develops a competitive model for duopolistic digital platforms where both sellers and buyers exhibit heterogeneous preferences.We explore the impact on social welfare and platform pricing strategies when sellers and buyers can opt for multi-homing—that is,joining multiple platforms.Specifically,the model investigates the effects of third-degree price discrimination by the platforms based on whether sellers choose to multi-home or not.To capture the preferences of sellers and buyers,we employ the Hotelling model and position the duopolistic platforms at the two trisection points on the Hotelling line.This approach allows us to mitigate the interference caused by varying preferences when investigating the impact of price discrimination.The findings indicate that third-degree price discrimination leads to an increase in seller surplus while simultaneously reducing buyer surplus and overall social welfare.The primary reason for this outcome is that price discrimination intensifies competition between the duopolistic platforms for sellers,thereby driving down the prices set for them.From the perspective of sellers,the duopolistic platforms find themselves in a Prisoner’s Dilemma,intensifying competitive pressures.These escalated competitive forces subsequ

关 键 词：数字经济 双边平台 价格歧视 多归属 HOTELLING模型 子博弈精炼纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]