地方政府间环境约束目标竞争:理论分析与实证检验  

Target Competition of Environmental Constraints among Local Governments:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test

作　　者：徐妍 郑冠群[2] 沈悦[3] XU Yan;ZHENG Guanqun;SHEN Yue(School of Economics and Management,Chang’an University,Xi’an Shaanxi 710064,China;School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an Shaanxi 710126,China;School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an Shaanxi 710061,China)

机构地区：[1]长安大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710064 [2]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710126 [3]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《生态经济》2024年第2期201-211,229,共12页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“地方政府行为与区域产业演化中的‘路径创造陷阱’:基于可实证空间均衡模型的多尺度交互作用研究”(71903016);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金优秀青年项目“地方政府行为与区域产业演化中的路径依赖研究”(300102230621);陕西省社会科学基金项目“空间关联视角下数字经济赋能陕西省高质量发展的效应测度与实现路径研究”(2022D008)。

摘　　要：地方政府间协同治理成为中国经济高质量发展的重要环节。论文通过整理275个地级市的政府工作报告中关于环境治理目标约束的内容,将其分为“硬约束”和“软约束”两类;构建地方政府间的演化博弈模型分析其策略行为,研究发现:地方政府选择环境治理目标约束的类型与邻近地方政府的政策选择相关,由周边地区污染示范外部效应以及自身经济增长偏好所决定,并且受地区间的经济规模差距的影响。进一步,利用2006—2018年中国275个地级市的数据检验假设中所描述的情况,回归结果显示假设中分析的各种策略都得到验证;分区域的检验,总体上满足假设,对个别在统计上不显著的结论提供了合理的解释。最后,针对前文分析提出了相关的政策建议。Collaborative governance among local governments has become an important link in China’s high-quality economic development.By sorting out the contents of environmental governance objective constraints in the government work reports of 275 prefecture level cities,this paper divides them into“hard constraints”and“soft constraints”.Next,the evolutionary game model between local governments is constructed to analyze its strategic behavior.The research shows that the type of environmental governance target constraints selected by local governments is related to the policy choice of adjacent local governments,determined by the external effects of pollution demonstration in surrounding areas and their own good economic growth,and affected by the economic scale gap between regions.Further,the data of 275 prefecture level cities in China from 2006 to 2018 are used to test the situation described in the hypothesis.The regression results show that various strategies analyzed in the hypothesis have been verified.Next,a sub-regional test is carried out,which also meets the hypothesis on the whole,and some conclusions that are not statistically significant also provide a reasonable explanation.Finally,the relevant policy suggestions are put forward according to the previous analysis.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 环境治理目标约束 地方政府工作报告 演化博弈模型 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] D630[政治法律—政治学]