考虑攻防博弈的调频辅助服务市场博弈均衡分析  

Equilibrium of Frequency Control Ancillary Service Market Based on Attack-defense Game

作　　者：陈春宇 刘一龙 张凯锋[3] 任必兴 王云鹏 戴雪梅 CHEN Chunyu;LIU Yilong;ZHANG Kaifeng;REN Bixing;WANG Yunpeng;DAI Xuemei(School of Electrical Engineering,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,Jiangsu Province,China;School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,KTH Royal Institute of Technology,11428 Stockholm,Sweden;School of Automation,Southeast University,Nanjing 210096,Jiangsu Province,China;State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Company Ltd.Research Institute,Nanjing 211103,Jiangsu Province,China;School of Automation Engineering,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Yangpu District,Shanghai 200090,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学电气工程学院,江苏省徐州市221116 [2]瑞典皇家理工学院电气工程与计算机科学学院,瑞典斯德哥尔摩11428 [3]东南大学自动化学院,江苏省南京市210096 [4]国网江苏省电力有限公司电力科学研究院,江苏省南京市211103 [5]上海电力大学自动化工程学院,上海市杨浦区200090

出　　处：《电网技术》2024年第2期679-687,共9页Power System Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(52207142,51977033);江苏省自然科学基金项目(BK20210512)。

摘　　要：通过不断健全市场交易规则,新型资源逐步参与调频市场,极大提升了调频性能与资源的灵活互济。然而,受制于成本因素,部分新型调频资源的网络安全防护等级较低,黑客可能利用网络安全漏洞破坏调频市场安全。基于此,提出一种考虑攻防博弈的调频市场博弈均衡分析方法。首先,分析考虑篡改防护薄弱型调频资源报价信息的黑客攻击行为;然后,从攻击者角度构建以利益攸关方获利最大化为目标的攻击模型,设计考虑攻防双方主从Stackelberg博弈的调频市场均衡模型;最后,分析基于列和约束生成(column-and-constraint generation,C&CG)算法的调频市场均衡结果,通过对30机组调频市场进行算例分析,容量收益平均偏移度从攻击下的113.89%变为防御后的12.56%,表明防御者可以抑制攻击者造成的市场均衡偏移。With the improvement of electricity market rules,the power system operator permits new energy resources to gradually participate in the frequency control ancillary service market.The participation of new energy resources greatly enhance the frequency regulation performance and mutual support of different energy resources.However,some frequency regulation resources are usually equipped with insufficient cyber security protection measures due to economic considerations.Under this situation,hackers may exploit the vulnerability of susceptible cyber physical systems to disrupt the operation of frequency control ancillary service market.Therefore,we analyze frequency modulation market game equilibrium considering the attack-defense game.First,we analyze the cyber attack behaviors aiming at manipulating the bidding information of susceptible resources.Second,we analyze the attack model aiming at maximizing the profit of the complicity.Next,a frequency modulation market equilibrium model considering the master-slave Stackelberg game of both sides of attack and defense is designed.Finally,the frequency modulation market equilibrium results based on the Column-and-Constraint Generation(C&CG)algorithm are analyzed.Through case analysis of 30-unit frequency regulation markets,the average deviation of capacity revenue change from 113.89%under attack to 12.56%after defense,indicating that the defender can to a certain extent suppress the market equilibrium deviation caused by the attacker.

关 键 词：新型调频资源 网络攻击与防御 STACKELBERG博弈 调频辅助服务市场 调频市场均衡 

分 类 号：TM721[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]