区块链赋能视角下煤矿生产安全监管演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game of Coal Mine Production Safety Supervision from Perspective of Blockchain Empowerment

作　　者：陈铁华[1] 王晓敏 李红霞[1] CHEN Tiehua;WANG Xiaomin;LI Hongxia(School of Management,Xi'an University of Science and Technology,Xi'an 710054,China)

机构地区：[1]西安科技大学管理学院,西安710054

出　　处：《煤炭技术》2024年第1期269-272,共4页Coal Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71273208)。

摘　　要：为探究政府监管、社会公众监督和煤矿安全生产的行为选择机制,基于演化博弈理论,构建了政府、社会公众和煤矿三方行为选择演化博弈模型,分析了演化博弈系统中各均衡点的稳定条件,最后探究了三方演化博弈中相关变量对三方行为演化策略选择的影响。研究结果表明:初始策略选择对三方演化稳定有显著影响;政府区块链创新投入成本对理想状态演化具有负向作用;对煤矿违规生产的惩罚力度、区块链直接效益和间接收益以及发生事故后给政府带来的声誉损失对理想状态演化具有正向作用;采用区块链监管可提高社会公众自身获得感,对参与煤矿安全监督具有正向作用。In order to explore the behavior selection mechanism of government supervision,public supervision and coal mine safety production,based on evolutionary game theory,a three-way behavior selection evolution game model of government,public and coal mine is constructed,the stability conditions of each equilibrium point in the evolutionary game system are analyzed,and finally the influence of relevant variables on the choice of three-way behavior evolution strategy in the tripartite evolutionary game is explored.The results show that the initial strategy selection has a significant impact on the stability of tripartite evolution.The investment cost of government blockchain innovation has a negative effect on the evolution of ideal state.The punishment for illegal production in coal mines,the direct and indirect benefits of blockchain,and the reputational loss to the government after accidents have a positive effect on the evolution of ideal state.The use of blockchain supervision can improve the public's sense of gain and have a positive effect on participating in coal mine safety supervision.

关 键 词：煤矿 动态博弈 区块链技术 社会监督 安全监管 

分 类 号：X924[环境科学与工程—安全科学]