多个大股东对资产剥离决策的影响研究  

Research on the Impact of Multiple Large Shareholders on Asset Divestiture Strategy

作　　者：张钰婧 薛有志 张荣荣[1,2] ZHANG Yujing;XUE Youzhi;ZHANG Rongrong(Nankai University,Tianjin,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院 [2]南开大学商学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第11期1600-1607,1705,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地资助重大项目(22JJD630006);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372092);天津市研究生科研创新资助项目(2021YJSB080)。

摘　　要：以2007~2020年中国A股上市公司为样本,探究多个大股东并存对资产剥离的影响。研究发现,多个大股东并存可以通过减少管理层自利主义行为及缓解融资约束降低资产剥离决策。进一步发现:多个大股东并存减少了不利于企业长期发展的非关联性资产剥离和战术性资产剥离;在连锁股东和股东股权未质押的情境下,多个大股东对资产剥离的负向效应更显著;多个大股东并存通过减少资产剥离进而提升了企业价值。Using samples of Chinese A-share listed firms during 2007~2020,this study investigates the impact of multiple large shareholders on asset divestitures.The result shows that multiple large shareholders could reduce asset divestitures by alleviating executive self-interest behaviors and financing constraints.Further research finds that multiple large shareholders reduce the divestiture of non-related assets and non-strategic asset divestiture that are not conducive to the long-term development of enterprises.The negative effects are more significant in the absence of cross-ownership and unpledged shareholders’equity.Multiple large shareholders can enhance corporate value by reducing asset divestitures.

关 键 词：多个大股东 非关联性资产剥离 战术性资产剥离 监督效应 管理层自利主义 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]