取消环保“一票否决”制对企业绿色创新的影响  

The Impact of Cancelling of the“One-Vote Veto”System for Environmental Protection on Green Innovation

作　　者：杨立成 刘春林[1] 田玲 YANG Licheng;LIU Chunlin;TIAN Ling(Nanjing University,Nanjing,China;Guizhou University,Guiyang,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院 [2]贵州大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第12期1800-1808,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072085);江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(20GLB004);南京大学工商管理系博士研究生科研创新助飞计划资助项目(ZFJH202201)。

摘　　要：以2016年取消环保“一票否决”考核制度作为外生冲击,利用双重差分(DID)模型,实证检验了取消环保“一票否决”制对地区企业绿色创新的影响。研究发现,取消环保“一票否决”制度能够促进企业绿色创新;此外,取消这一考核制度所引发的绿色创新激励效应对前期“刚达标”地区的企业影响更大。基于制度响应动机的拓展性研究发现,国有资产占比、市场化水平均能调节取消环保“一票否决”制对企业绿色创新的正向影响。Using the difference in difference(DID)model,this study empirically evaluates the impact of the cancellation of the“one-vote veto”evaluation system for environmental protection in 2016 on green innovation of regional firms.It is discovered that cancelling the“one-vote veto”system can promote green innovation of enterprises.This study also reveals that the firms in the earlier“just-up-to-standard”regions are more affected by the incentive effect of green innovation brought on by the cancellation of this assessment system.According to the findings of an extension study of institutional response motivation,the proportion of state-owned assets and the level of marketization can respectively have a moderating effect in the impact of cancelling the“one-vote veto”system of environmental protection on firm’s green innovation.

关 键 词：环保考核制度 一票否决 柔性化 地方政府 绿色创新 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]