企业避税的同群效应研究——基于新制度主义组织趋同理论  被引量:2

Study on the Peer Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance——Based on the Organizational Convergence Theory of New Institutionalism

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作  者:郭超[1] 王钰 GUO Chao;WANG Yu(Anyang Institute of Technology,Anyang,Henan 455000;Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142)

机构地区:[1]安阳工学院,河南安阳455000 [2]中国财政科学研究院,北京100142

出  处:《管理现代化》2024年第1期111-120,共10页Modernization of Management

基  金:河南省哲学社会科学规划一般项目(项目编号:2022BJJ002)。

摘  要:基于新制度主义组织趋同理论,企业避税不仅是存在于企业内部的问题,其组织间相互影响的模仿行为更值得探讨。本文以2008—2020年上市公司的数据为研究样本,采用双向固定效应模型实证检验后,发现企业避税存在同群效应,且会选择模仿同行业领导企业和同地区企业。环境不确定性的提高增强了企业避税的同群效应强度。通过进一步研究发现,企业内部数字化水平和地区社会信任水平对环境不确定性下的避税同群效应具有促进作用,而审计师外部监督强度对其有抑制作用。文章为政府引导企业减少避税行为、提高税收遵从度,增强社会责任的履践提供了理论基础和实践路径。Based on the new institutional organizational convergence theory,corporate tax avoid-ance is not only a problem existing in the enterprise,the imitation behavior of mutual influence between organizations is more worthy of discussion.Taking the data of listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as the research sample,the bidirectional fixed effect model is adopted to empirically test the existence of peer effect of corporate tax avoidance,and they will choose to imitate leading enterprises in the same industry and enterprises in the same region.The increase of environmental uncertainty enhances the peer effect strength of corporate tax avoidance.Further research shows that the level of internal digitization and the level of regional social trust can promote the peer effect of tax avoidance under environmental uncertain-ty,while the intensity of auditor external supervision can inhibit it.This paper provides a theoretical basis and practical direction for the government to guide enterprises to reduce tax avoidance,improve tax com-pliance and enhance the practice of social responsibility.

关 键 词:企业避税 同群效应 环境不确定性 社会责任 审计师监督 

分 类 号:F234.4[经济管理—会计学]

 

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