从“反运气”到“反风险”:认识论的新转向  

A New Turn of Epistemology from“Anti-luck”to“Anti-risk”

作　　者：黄俊维 HUANG Junwei(School of Philosophy and Social Development,Huaqiao University,Xiamen,Fujian,361021)

机构地区：[1]华侨大学哲学与社会发展学院,福建厦门361021

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2024年第1期38-44,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：“知识与运气不相容”是当今的认识论共识,能否识别并排除认知运气成为鉴别一个知识理论是否可取的试金石。然而,回顾以排除认知运气为核心的知识理论,可以发现这一共识并不存在牢固的理论基础。此外,本文从“幸运知识”案例、风险概念的优先性和知识谱系学三个角度出发,试图表明,认识论学者一直以来所讨论的“反运气直觉”其实是“反风险直觉”,理解何谓知识的核心并非认知运气,而是认知风险。It is a widespread consensus in epistemology that knowledge is incompatible with luck and the ability to identify and exclude epistemic luck is a touchstone to test the validity of a theory of knowledge.However,by analyzing the theory of knowledge which takes epistemic luck as its core,we can find that this consensus does not have a solid theoretical basis.In addition,from such three perspectives as the cases of lucky knowledge,the priority of risk concept and the genealogy of knowledge,this paper tries to show that the“antiluck intuition”discussed by epistemologists is actually“anti-risk intuition”,and that the core of understanding knowledge is not epistemic luck,but epistemic risks.

关 键 词：反运气直觉 认知运气 认知风险 知识谱系学 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]