考虑大众活跃度的众包配送违规行为控制微分博弈研究  

Research on differential game of default control in crowdsourcing logistics distribution considering public activity

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:武小平[1] 杨琳[1] 施壮飞 WU Xiaoping;YANG Lin;SHI Zhuangfei(College of Modem Posts,Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications,Xi’an 710061,China)

机构地区:[1]西安邮电大学现代邮政学院,西安710061

出  处:《系统工程理论与实践》2023年第12期3606-3618,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基  金:教育部人文社科项目(19YJA790070);陕西省自然科学基金(2019JM-369);陕西教育厅自然科学专项(16JK1700)。

摘  要:针对如何通过控制参与主体违规行为以防范配送过程中违规风险的问题.考虑大众活跃度分别构建了在集中式决策、分散式决策以及具有成本分担的分散式决策下的最优控制问题微分博弈模型,分析了三种情形下参与主体控制违规行为的努力水平和众包系统整体收益变化的趋势,探讨了大众活跃度、奖惩因子和分担比例等因素对参与主体控制违规行为努力水平的影响.结果表明:从分散式决策到具有成本分担的分散式决策,再到集中式决策,控制违规行为努力水平和整体收益呈递增趋势;众包平台可以通过调整奖惩因子和成本分担比例来影响大众活跃度,当活跃度在区间[0.8,1]时,分散式决策下,各参与主体控制违规行为的努力水平,接近集中决策下的控制违规行为的努力水平,违规行为数量波动趋于平缓,促使众包物流的收益整体增长.How to prevent the risk of violation in the distribution process by controlling the violation behavior of the participants?The differential game theory is applied to study the strategic problem of crowdsourcing logistics distribution participants controlling illegal behavior considering public activity.The partial differential equations of the optimal control problem of the participants under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making are respectively constructed.The influence of public activity,reward and punishment factors and proportion of sharing on participants’efforts to control illegal behaviors was discussed.The results of the study are as follows.From decentralized decision-making to crowdsourcing platform incentive decentralized decision-making,and then to centralize decision-making,the level of efforts to control violations and the overall income shows an increasing trend.Crowdsourcing platform can influence public activity by adjusting reward and punishment factor and the proportion of cost-sharing.When the activity level is in the range[0.8,1],the effort level of participants to control violations under decentralized decision is close to that under the centralized decision,and the fluctuation of the number of violations tends to be flat,which promotes the overall increase of the revenue of crowdsourcing logistics.

关 键 词:众包物流 大众活跃度 微分博弈 违规控制 

分 类 号:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象