中国式融资融券制度能够抑制研发操纵吗?——基于“准自然实验”的经验证据  

Can a Chinese-Style Margin Trading Program Curb R&D Manipulation?Empirical Evidence Based on“Quasi-Natural Experiment”

作　　者：陈艳利 刘亚 蒋琪 CHEN Yanli;LIU Ya;JIANG Qi(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics/China Internal Control Research Center,Dalian 110625,China;School of Politics and Public Administration,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]西南政法大学政治与公共管理学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2024年第2期85-95,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72073019);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20YJA790004);辽宁省教育厅项目(JYTMS20230636)。

摘　　要：资本市场交易制度与公司治理有机联动对于助推经济高质量发展具有重要意义。基于2008—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,利用中国融资融券标的分步扩容的准自然实验,实证检验融资融券外部监管对公司内部研发操纵的治理效应。研究发现,融资融券这一资本市场交易制度的完善举措显著抑制了公司研发操纵,且该抑制效应在非国有、融资约束更高、内部控制质量更低及分析师关注度更低的公司中更为明显。机制检验表明,融资融券制度通过信息传递效应与注意力集聚效应对研发操纵产生影响。The organic linkage between the capital market trading system and corporate governance is of great significance in promoting high-quality economic development.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021,this paper examines the governance effect of external supervision of margin trading and short selling on the internal R&D manipulation of enterprises by using the quasi-natural experimental scenarios of China’s margin trading program.It is found that margin trading program,a measure to improve the capital market trading system,has a significant inhibitory effect on the R&D manipulation of enterprises,and the inhibitory effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,companies with higher financing constraints,lower quality of internal controls and less analyst attention.The mechanism test shows that the margin trading program has an impact on R&D manipulation through the information transmission effect and the attention gathering effect.

关 键 词：融资融券制度 卖空机制 资本市场交易机制 产业政策 研发操纵 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275