银行行政处罚监管与审计定价:溢出还是替代?——来自中国上市商业银行的经验证据  

Bank Administrative Penalty Supervision and Audit Pricing:Spillover or Substitution?Empirical Evidence from Listed Commercial Banks in China

作　　者：池国华[1] 周正义 CHI Guohua;ZHOU Zhengyi(School of Internal Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China;School of Government Audit,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学内部审计学院,江苏南京211815 [2]南京审计大学政府审计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2024年第2期1-12,共12页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(72172061);江苏2023年度高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2023SJYB0343)。

摘　　要：以2007—2021年沪深A股上市银行为研究样本,探究银行监管机构行政处罚监管对审计定价决策的影响,研究发现银行监管机构的行政处罚监管显著提高了银行审计定价,经过一系列稳健性检验后结论依然成立,佐证了溢出效应假说。同时,作用机制检验结果表明,行政处罚监管主要是通过风险溢价的路径提高了审计定价。进一步分析发现:行政处罚监管强度越大以及查出内部控制相关问题越多,审计定价越高;在非国有银行、非“四大”会计师事务所审计、内部控制质量低和信息不对称高这四种情形下,行政处罚监管对审计定价提高的影响更为显著;行政处罚监管对外部审计的溢出效应能够促进双方发挥协同治理功能,从而更好地抑制了银行违法违规倾向。研究结论对银行监管机构和外部审计师加强协作,扎实推进党的二十大报告和中央金融工作会议强调的加强和完善现代金融监管、守住不发生系统性风险底线的方针具有重要启示意义。In order to explore the impact of administrative penalty supervision by banking regulators on audit pricing,this paper takes A-share listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges from 2007 to 2021 as research samples.The result shows that the administrative penalty supervision by banking regulators significantly increases bank audit pricing,and the conclusion remains valid after a series of robustness tests,supporting the spillover effect hypothesis.At the same time,the test of action mechanism shows that administrative penalty supervision improves audit pricing mainly through the path of risk premium.Further analysis shows that the higher the intensity of administrative penalty supervision and the more internal control related problems are found,the higher the audit pricing is.In the following four situations of non-state-owned banks,non-“Big Four”audit,the samples with low internal control quality and high information asymmetry,administrative penalty supervision has significant improvement on audit pricing;The spillover effect of administrative penalty supervision on external audit can promote the two sides to play the synergistic governance function,so as to better restrain the tendency of banks to violate laws and regulations.The research conclusions have important implications for banking regulators and external auditors to strengthen cooperation,steadily promote the strengthening and improvement of modern financial regulation as emphasized in the 20th CPC National Congress Report and the Central Financial Work Conference on the principle of guarding against systemic risk.

关 键 词：银行监管 行政处罚 审计定价 上市银行 内部控制 溢出效应 金融风险 高质量发展 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]