税收稽查的震慑效应:一个多期博弈模型及其经验检验  

Regional Deterrent Effect of Tax Inspection:A Study Based on a Multi-period Game Model and Empirical Test

作　　者：游家兴[1] 林慧 蓝永泉 YOU Jiaxing;LIN Hui;LAN Yongquan(School of Management,Xiamen University)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,361005

出　　处：《经济研究》2023年第12期59-76,共18页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“大数据驱动的税收征管与非上市公司财务行为——基于金税三期工程的准自然实验”(批准号72272125)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文从政府与企业两个主体出发构建多周期博弈模型,所得到的均衡解表明:政府能够通过加大税收威慑力度减少税收稽查,从而有效实现以罚代管。但与此同时,在企业相较于政府有更快响应/学习能力的情形下,企业能够预见政府税收监管策略,在后续的博弈周期中会通过税收稽查案件的公开信息进行学习,更新对实际税收稽查力度的认知,并最终调整自己的避税决策。本文基于2005—2016年期间716个税收辖区内107583个企业开展的实证检验也印证了上述理论预期:一方面,惩处较为严厉的稽查事件发生后,其所在税收辖区内其他企业的避税程度显著下降,证实了严厉的税收违规稽查能够在区域内发挥震慑效应,起到“惩一儆百”的积极作用。另一方面,惩处较轻的稽查事件则无法发挥显著的震慑效应。并且,严厉税收稽查事件的震慑效应仅持续到事件发生后的两年,随后震慑效果则不再显著。本文从一个新的视角拓展了企业税收遵从度的影响因素研究,同时为税收稽查的外部性提供了经验证据,对于税收征管工作的完善与优化具有积极的现实启示意义。Taxation is the main source of local government fiscal revenue and an important component of enterprise operating costs.The National Taxation Work Conference has emphasized that it is imperative to improve the scientificity,accuracy,and efficiency of tax collection and management.Tax inspection is of great significance for deepening the tax system reform,ensuring the integrity of national fiscal revenue,creating a fair market competition and business environment,building a social integrity system,and even promoting the high-quality development of the country.As stated by the deterrent effect theory in the field of criminal economics,the purpose of regulation and punishment is not only to punish the violators themselves but also to warn and deter other potential violations,thereby preventing similar criminal behaviors.The same applies to tax inspections.If tax regulatory activities can not only punish taxpayers who evade taxes but also play a strong deterrent role against other enterprises,then the efficiency of tax regulatory work can be maximized with a certain amount of regulatory resources and costs.This paper constructs a two-stage game model from the perspectives of government and enterprises,and the equilibrium solution obtained shows that the government can reduce tax inspections by increasing tax deterrence,thereby effectively implementing punishment as a substitute for inspections.However,in situations where enterprises have a faster response/learning ability compared to the government,they can foresee government tax regulatory strategies,learn from public information about tax inspection cases in subsequent game cycles,update their understanding of actual tax inspection intensity,and ultimately adjust their tax avoidance decisions.This paper manually collects 267 tax violation inspection cases from the China Taxation Auditing Yearbook,combined with tax investigation data,and uses 107,583 enterprises in 716 tax jurisdictions from 2005 to 2016 as research samples to empirically test whether tax violation

关 键 词：税收稽查 震慑效应 企业避税 多期博弈模型 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学] F224.32