南水北调中线工程突发水污染生态补偿机制研究  

Research on the Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Sudden Water Pollution in the Central Route Project of South-to-North Water Diversion

作　　者：刘钢[1,2] 李睿萌 段睿睿 牛富 LIU Gang;LI Ruimeng;DUAN Ruirui;NIU Fu(Laboratory of Computation and Analytics of Complex Management System(CACMS),Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;School of Information,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100084,China;School of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power,Hebei University of Engineering,Handan 056038,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学复杂管理系统实验室,天津300072 [2]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [3]中国人民大学信息学院,北京100084 [4]河北工程大学水利水电学院,河北邯郸056038

出　　处：《华北水利水电大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第2期101-108,共8页Journal of North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2021YFC3201204);广东省水利科技创新项目(2020-06)。

摘　　要：突发水污染已成为制约南水北调中线工程可持续调水的重大安全隐患,亟须解决南水北调中线工程突发水污染的生态补偿机制设计问题。针对应由中线局承担责任的南水北调中线干渠突发水污染场景,从多利益相关者合作视角出发,明确了中线局向纳污地政府提供生态补水的突发水污染生态补偿机制,基于合作博弈理论,构建了中线局与纳污地政府合作联盟的纳什议价模型,并以河南省邓州市为例开展研究,主要研究结果表明:①生态补水天数与纳污总损失呈现出显著的正向相关关系,且伴随纳污总损失逐步增大,中线局议价能力对补水天数的影响能力呈现出边际递减特征。②中线局生态补水成本与生态补水天数具有显著的正向关系,随着中线局议价能力的增强,生态补水成本的规模效益呈现一定的弱化趋势。③在一定的生态补水规模范围内,中线局与纳污地政府能够达成有效的合作联盟。Sudden water pollution has become a major safety hazard restricting the sustainable water diversion of the Central Route Project of South-to-North Water Diversion,and it is urgent to solve the ecological compensation mechanism design problem of sudden water pollution in the Central Route Project.Aiming at the sudden water pollution scenario of the trunk canal of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project that should be held responsible by the Central Route Construction Management Bureau of South-to-North Water Diversion Project,from the perspective of multi-stakeholder cooperation,it is proposed the ecological compensation mechanism of sudden water pollution that the Central Route Bureau provides ecological replenishment to the pollution-bearing government,the Nash bargaining model is constructed between the Central Route Bureau and the pollution-bearing government based on the cooperative game theory,and taking Dengzhou City in Henan as an example to carry out a case study,the main research results shows:①The days of ecological water replenishment and the total loss of pollution containment show a significant positive correlation,and with the gradual increase of the total loss of pollution,the influence of the bargaining power of the Central Route Bureau on the days of water replenishment shows a marginal decreasing characteristic.②There is a significant positive relationship between the ecological water replenishment cost of the Central Route Bureau and the days of ecological water replenishment,with the enhancement of the bargaining power of the Central Route Bureau,the scale effect of ecological water replenishment costs has shown a certain weakening trend.③Within a certain scale of ecological water replenishment,the Central Route Bureau and the pollution-bearing government can establish an effective cooperative alliance.

关 键 词：南水北调中线工程 突发水污染 纳什议价博弈 生态补偿机制 

分 类 号：X52[环境科学与工程—环境工程]