基于礼物交换博弈实验的互惠机制对医生利他行为激励的启示  

Implications of Reciprocity Mechanism Based on Gift Exchange Game for Physicians' Altruistic Behavior Incentives

作　　者：刘文婷[1] 韩优莉[1] Liu Wenting;Han Youli(School of Public Health,Capital Medical University,Beijing,100069,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]首都医科大学公共卫生学院,北京100069

出　　处：《中国卫生经济》2024年第1期1-3,共3页Chinese Health Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72174129)。

摘　　要：目的:从维护利他性角度为构建符合医疗行业特点的激励制度提供思路。方法:将经济学领域的互惠利他理论和礼物交换博弈实验引入医生利他行为激励。结果:提出医疗领域医、患、管三方委托代理关系的间接互惠利他理论和注重健康价值衡量的薪酬激励设想,构建基于三方礼物交换博弈实验的医生利他行为激励机制模型。结论:采用价值医疗理念对医生利他行为进行激励,构建符合医疗行业特点的激励制度,可促进医疗领域高质量发展。Objective:To propose ideas for designing an incentive system that aligns with the unique characteristics of the medical industry while maintaining altruism.Methods:The concepts of reciprocal altruism theory and gift exchange game experiments are introduced from the field of economics to incentivize physicians' altruistic behavior.Results:It proposes the indirect reciprocal altruism theory, which focuses on the three-party principal-agent relationship between physicians, patients, and management in the medical field. The compensation incentive concept that measures health value is also introduced. Additionally,it constructs a model for the incentive mechanism of physicians' altruistic behavior based on the three-party gift exchange game.Conclusion:Based on the concept of value-based incentives for physicians' altruistic behavior, it develops an incentive system that caters to the unique characteristics of the medical industry and promotes its high-quality development.

关 键 词：互惠利他 礼物交换 医生激励 

分 类 号：R1-9[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学] R-012