全球最低税与国家利益:论实施支柱二的策略动机  

Global Minimum Tax and National Interests:Strategic Incentives for Pillar Two Adoption

作　　者：崔威[1] 刘奇超(译) 陈新(译)[3] 沈涛(译) WEI Cui(University of British Columbia,Vancouver V6T 1Z4,Canada)

机构地区：[1]不列颠哥伦比亚大学,加拿大温哥华V6T 1Z4 [2]天津市滨海新区财政局 [3]国家税务总局苏州市税务局 [4]华东政法大学国际法学院

出　　处：《税务与经济》2024年第1期4-31,F0002,共29页Taxation and Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(23BFX080)。

摘　　要：支柱二主要由收入纳入规则(IIR)、合格国内最低补足税(QDMT)和低税支付规则(UTPR,低税利润规则)三个部分组成。系统分析实施或保留支柱二的三个组成部分的策略动机可以发现,对致力于国家收入最大化的政府来说,这种实施动机之弱令人惊讶。研究表明,如果各国的实施是由国家自身利益所推动,那么,即使在许多国家实施支柱二之后,该项制度仍可能瓦解。事实上,支柱二考虑到各国之间存在大量财富转移的可能性这一事实,使得其极不可能实现“激励相容”。同时,对UTPR的超属地和非超属地解释提出了关于国际法的不同规范性问题,因此,关于UTPR的规范性辩论应更加关注其积极特征。This Article systematically analyzes strategic incentives for adopting or retaining Pillar Two′s three main components:the Income Inclusion Rule(IIR),the Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-Up Tax(QDMT),and the Undertaxed Profits Rule(UTPR).It finds that such incentives are surprisingly weak for national-income-maximizing governments.The Article′s findings suggest that if countries are motivated by national self-interest,then even after many adopt Pillar Two,the regime may still unravel.Indeed,the fact that Pillar Two contemplates very substantial wealth transfers among countries makes its"incentive compatibility"highly unlikely.The Article also shows the extraterritorial and non-extraterritorial interpretations of the UTPR raise distinct normative questions about international law;normative debates about the UTPR should therefore pay closer attention to the UTPR′s positive features.

关 键 词：全球最低税 支柱二 国际税收 收入纳入规则 低税支付规则 合格国内最低补足税 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]