地方政府竞争的生产率效应研究:理论机制与经验证据  

Research on the Productivity Effect of Local Government Competition——Theoretical Mechanism and Empirical Evidence

作　　者：杨振[1] 李泽浩 YANG Zhen;LI Ze-hao(Department of Economics,Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C,National Academy of Governance,Beijing 100091,China;School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]中共中央党校(国家行政学院)经济学部,北京100091 [2]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《经济体制改革》2024年第1期33-42,共10页Reform of Economic System

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“适应高质量发展的地方政府竞争机制优化研究”(21BJL033);中共中央党校(国家行政学院)校(院)级重大理论和现实问题研究专项(2023)“优化完善制造业产业政策问题研究”。

摘　　要：地方政府竞争有多种政策工具支持,随着央地关系及财政支出分权程度的变化,地方政府对企业的支持策略会有所调整,从而可能表现出显著的企业生产率效应。以我国沪深A股制造业上市公司2008~2020年数据为样本,研究地方政府竞争对企业全要素生产率的影响,在此基础上考察地方政府所受的财政分权激励与政绩考核激励对这一影响的调节效应,研究发现:地方政府间财政支出竞争显著影响企业全要素生产率,但不同竞争工具具有不同的生产率效应;财政支出分权程度的提高,弱化了财政补贴对全要素生产率的促进作用,也强化了税收优惠对全要素生产率的抑制作用;政绩考核导向由“增长速度”向“发展质量”的转变,增强了地方政府竞争对生产率的促进作用,但也加深了地方面临的财政支出分权约束影响。因此,应积极推动央地财权事权关系再调整,优化设计地方政府在推动全要素生产率提升上的激励机制。The competition between local governments is supported by various policy tools.As the relationship between the central and local governments changes and the degree of fiscal expenditure decentralization changes,the intervention strategies of local governments towards enterprises will change,resulting in significant productivity effects for enterprises.This article takes the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 as a sample to study the impact of local government competition on total factor productivity of enterprises.Based on this,it examines the moderating effect of fiscal and political incentives received by local governments.Research finds that the competition between local governments'fiscal expenditures significantly affects the total factor productivity of enterprises,but the two forms of fiscal expenditures,namely fiscal subsidies and tax incentives,have opposite productivity effects.The increase in the degree of fiscal expenditure decentralization not only weakens the promoting effect of fiscal subsidies on total factor productivity,but also enhances the inhibitory effect of tax incentives on total factor productivity.The shift in the direction of central performance evaluation from"growth rate"to"development quality"will further exacerbate the negative regulatory effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization on the productivity effect of local government competition.Therefore,it is necessary to actively promote the readjustment of the relationship between central and local financial powers,and improve the financial and political incentives for local governments to promote the improvement of total factor productivity.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 全要素生产率 财政支出分权 政绩考核调整 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]