论心智化概念的双重约束  

On the Dual Constraints of Mentalized Concepts

作　　者：施展旦[1] SHI Zhandan(School of Marxism Studies,Jiangsu Police Institute,Nanjing 210031,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏警官学院马克思主义学院,江苏南京210031

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第1期41-48,共8页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2018SJA0451)。

摘　　要：对弗雷格的涵义概念的心智化解释,是意义理论研究从语言本位转向心灵本位的标志之一。福多在阐述概念理论时指出,在弗雷格的本体论前提下,不能一致地把涵义等同于呈现模式。呈现模式本质上是思想语言符号,概念应被理解为由指称与呈现模式构成的一个二元对。但是,福多的概念结构并不能融贯地满足成功交流所需要的公共性和心理解释的双重约束。相对地,在理性行动约束下,如果摆脱弗雷格把思想作为独立实体以及福多的心智优先性的本体论束缚,完整把握语言、思想和世界的三重结构,在行动主义的框架中,可以协调概念的公共性和心理解释之间的关系。The mentalized interpretation of Frege's sense is one of the signs of the shift in the study of meaning from language to mind.Fodor points out that,under Frege's ontology,meaning cannot be consistently equated with modes of presentation in the theory of concept.Modes of presentation are essentially symbols of language of thought,and concepts should be understood as a binary pair composed of reference and modes of presentation.However,Fodorean structure of concept cannot meet the dual constraints of publicity and psychological explanation which requires for successful communication.Conversely,under the constraint of rational action,if we get rid of Frege's ontological constraints of treating thought as an independent entity and Fodor's mental priority,and fully grasp the triple structure of language,thought,and the world,we can coordinate the relationship between the publicity of concepts and psychological explanation within the framework of activism.

关 键 词：呈现模式 概念 心智表征 公共性 心理解释 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]