信息不对称下技术供应链专利许可合同设计  

Optimal Patent Licensing in a Technology Supply Chain under Information Asymmetry

作　　者：金亮 朱颖[2,3] Jin Liang;Zhu Ying(School of Business Administration,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330032,China;School of Public Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;College of Law and Public Management,Jishou University,Jishou 416000,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学工商管理学院,江西南昌330032 [2]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433 [3]吉首大学法学与公共管理学院,湖南吉首416000

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第1期211-219,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期项目(23FGLB080);国家自然科学基金项目(71902079);江西省社会科学基金项目(22YJ09);江西省自然科学基金项目(20232BAB211008);江西省市场监督管理局(知识产权局)软科学研究计划项目(2023-17)。

摘　　要：本文从知识产权转为现实生产力的视角,针对跨国技术供应链中的专利许可合同设计及其影响问题,构建信息不对称下的动态博弈模型,分析技术供应商的最优专利许可合同设计及其对品牌企业与OEM协同研发、定价等决策的影响。研究发现:策略性地选择固定收费形式或者双重收费形式的专利许可合同是技术供应商的最优选择,这从理论上证明了这两种形式许可合同的存在性;在固定收费形式的专利许可合同下,品牌企业有动机增加研发投资额,且满足一定条件时能给OEM和消费者福利带来“正外部性”。然而,专利许可方与被许可方之间存在利润分配的不平等,技术供应商能占有比其他企业更大的利润份额。In recent years,the level of intellectual property protection in our country has been continuously improved.Therefore,as the key to the use of intellectual property rights,patent licensing is becoming more and more common among enterprises.However,unreasonable licensing contracts often lead to patent infringe⁃ments and legal disputes,such as patent litigation disputes between Huawei and Qualcomm.In this context,the following three questions are studied:(i)How does patent-holding company design and choose the form of patent licensing contracts to avoid patent infringement disputes?(ii)How does the licensee determine its manufacturing outsourcing strategy?(iii)How will realistic factors such as market conditions and product sales affect the equilibrium of the technology supply chain?In this paper,a transnational technology supply chain consisting of a technology supplier,a branded manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)is considered,then three multi-stage dynamic game model are constructed with asymmetric information.In this model,the technology supplier needs to design the licensing contract and guarantee that the branded manufacturer will be willing to accept the contract.The branded manufacturer needs to determine the product sale price and R&D investment level.The OEM decide the product outsourcing production price.The main work includes four parts.At first,the optimal licensing contract is proposed and the optimal pricing and R&D investment decisions are analyzed,respectively.Second,the technology supplier’s optimal licensing contract selection and the nature of the licensing contract are analyzed.Third,to address the value of licensing contract,the optimal pricing and R&D investment decisions are compared under different types of licensing contracts.Finally,the impact of key parameter on the equilibrium of the transnational technology supply chain is illustrated through a numerical example.The results show that,in the patent licensing stage,the optimal licensing contracts includes fixed-f

关 键 词：跨国技术供应链 专利许可 信息不对称 动态博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]