政府审计、管理层特征与国有非金融企业影子银行化  

Government Audit,Management Characteristics and Shadow Banking of State-Owned Non-financial Enterprises

作　　者：张月玲[1] 石珂钰 王守成 ZHANG Yueling;SHI Keyu;WANG Shoucheng(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao,Shandong 266590,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590

出　　处：《山东科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第1期64-78,共15页Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：以2010—2018年国有非金融上市公司为研究对象,分析了政府审计监管下,国有企业高管政企合作特征和晋升特征与企业影子银行业务的关系。研究结果表明:国有非金融企业高管政企合作特征与企业影子银行业务规模显著负相关,高管晋升特征与企业影子银行业务规模显著正相关;政府审计对上述关系起到不同程度的监管和威慑作用。进一步研究发现,企业显性金融资产受缚会使影子银行业务增加。这对于防止国有企业实体经济“脱实向虚”和研究政府审计影响国企高管决策的路径提供了理论支持。未来应进一步加强党组织对国有企业的领导;国家审计机关应对存在晋升预期的高管所在国企,增加审计力度和审计资源供给;同时,国有企业方面应当合理配置金融资产,降低金融资产错配率。Taking the state-owned non-financial listed enterprises from 2010 to 2018 as the research object,this paper studies the relationship between the characteristics of executive government exterprise cooperation and promotion of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises and shadow banking business under the supervision of government audit.The results show that the characteristics of government enterprise cooperation among executives in the state-owned non-financial enterprises is significantly negatively correlated with the scale of shadow banking business,and the promotion expectation of the senior executives is significantly positively correlated with the scale of shadow banking business.Government audit supervision strengthens the inhibition effect of political affiliation on shadow banking and inhibits the promotion effect of political promotion on shadow banking.Constrained corporate explicit financial assets will increase shadow banking.The research results provide theoretical support for preventing the real economy of the state-owned enterprises from“being diverted out of the real economy”and deepening the transmission path between government audit and the decision-making of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises.In the future,the leadership of Communist Party of China should be further strengthened in the state-owned enterprises.The state audit institutions should increase the audit intensity and supply of audit resources to the state-owned enterprises where the senior executives are expected to be promoted.At the same time,the state-owned enterprises should allocate financial assets reasonably and reduce the misallocation rate of financial assets.

关 键 词：非金融企业影子银行化 管理层特征 政府审计 国有企业 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]