基于势博弈的智能电网需求侧管理问题  

Potential game for demand-side management of smart grids

作　　者：刘敏 王金环[1] LIU Min;WANG Jin-huan(School of Science,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《控制与决策》2024年第2期545-550,共6页Control and Decision

基　　金：河北省自然科学基金项目(F2021202032)。

摘　　要：基于矩阵半张量积方法研究智能电网需求侧管理问题.首先,基于势博弈的判定条件,利用势博弈对智能电网需求侧管理问题建模并构造相应的势函数;其次,当策略更新规则为时间级联型短视最优响应时,设计牵制控制使得势博弈在演化过程中镇定到最优纳什均衡;然后,在牵制控制设计过程中,为减少控制成本,设计算法得到尽可能少的控制玩家;最后,通过算例验证理论结果的有效性.This work investigates the demand-side management of smart grids via the semi-tensor product of matrices.Firstly,based on the criterion of potential games,the potential game is used to model the demand-side management of smart grids and the corresponding potential function can be constructed.Secondly,when the cascading myopic best response adjustment is used as the strategy updating rule,a pinning control is designed to make the potential game converge to the optimal Nash equilibrium.During the process of designing the pinning control,in order to reduce the control cost,an algorithm is constructed to get as few control players as possible.Finally,an example is provided to verify the theoretical results.

关 键 词：势博弈 矩阵半张量积 演化博弈 智能电网需求侧管理 牵制控制 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]